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INTRODUCTION
Starting around 1990 and especially following the 1995 Republican
takeover of Congress, congressional committees have paid less attention to
constitutional issues than before. During the same period, the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees have become Congress’s dominant voice on
constitutional questions. In the pages that follow, I link these two phenomena to party polarization in Congress. Specifically, I argue that party polarization has played an important role in defining the policy agendas of
*

Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. In thinking through the points made in this Article, I have greatly benefited from conversations with Steve Calabresi, Larry Evans, Mike Gerhardt, Mark Miller, Bruce Peabody, Mitch Pickerill, David Rohde, Jeff
Rosen, Steve Smith, and Sean Theriault. This Article was improved by questions and comments at the
American Political Science Association annual meeting and at a faculty workshop at the University of
Texas School of Law. My general thinking on this topic has been shaped by past collaborations with
Louis Fisher and Keith Whittington. I also owe thanks to my hardworking research assistants Perry
Cooper and Nick Cumings.
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congressional committees, committee resources and power, congressional
attitudes toward the Supreme Court, and the willingness of committee
chairs to allow members of the minority party to call witnesses and otherwise air objections to committee proposals. Each of these factors contributes both to diminishing committee interest in the Constitution and to the
increasing share of constitutional hearings1 held by the Judiciary Committees. Yet polarization is not the only variable that figures into the number
and location of constitutional hearings. Court decisionmaking and presidential action, for example, may prompt lawmakers (often at the urging of
interest groups) to hold constitutional hearings. Moreover, even though
party polarization affects many of the factors lowering interest in congressional hearings, it does not always depress congressional committee interest
in constitutional questions. For example, when Republicans gained control
of Congress in 1995, federalism figured prominently into the party’s agenda, and as such, there was a spike in constitutional hearings.
In calling attention to factors that influence the number and location of
constitutional hearings, this Article extends the analysis of a 2004 chapter
that I coauthored with Keith Whittington and Hutch Hicken.2 That chapter
mapped patterns of constitutional hearing activity in Congress from 1970 to
2000. At that time, patterns of declining committee interest in the Constitution were harder to discern, as was the pivotal role that party polarization
played in transforming congressional practices in congressional hearing activity.3 By analyzing the period from 2000 to 2009, this Article will provide
a somewhat different and hopefully fuller account of congressional committee consideration of constitutional questions.4 In particular, by explaining
why party polarization is likely to depress committee interest in constitutional hearings, this Article explicitly links the overall decline in constitutional hearings with increasing party polarization. But this Article also
accounts for the fact that congressional practices are both extremely dynam1

See infra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the methodology employed in this Article in
identifying constitutional hearings).
2
Keith E. Whittington, Neal Devins & Hutch Hicken, The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971–2000, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 396 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
3
The growing dominion of the Judiciary Committees was discernable at that time, see id. at 405–
08, but in 2000 and from 2002 to 2009, the Judiciary Committees heard an even larger percentage of
constitutional hearings than at any other time in that study. See infra Figure 7; cf. infra Figures 9–12
(showing the increased percentage of constitutional hearings heard by the Judiciary Committees from
1994 to 2009).
4
Most notably, the data from 1970 through 2000 do not suggest declining congressional interest in
the Constitution. Because of the 1995 Republican takeover and the subsequent spike in congressional
interest in the Constitution, the data from 1995 to 2000 do not suggest a meaningful diminution in committee consideration of constitutional questions. See Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at
397 (noting a “surprising consistency in congressional hearing activity”). Eight years later, the data do
suggest a diminution in interest. See infra Figures 1, 3 & 4. Correspondingly, the impact of party polarization on the number and location of constitutional hearings seems stronger today than ever.
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ic and extremely situational.5 For example, on the one hand, the Gingrich
Revolution of 1995 immediately transformed congressional practices and
priorities; on the other hand, neither the 2007 Democratic takeover of Congress nor the 2008 election of Barack Obama led to dramatic change in the
patterns of constitutional hearings.6
This Article will proceed in three parts. In Part I, I detail the data on
House and Senate practices from 1970 to 2009, charting the frequency of
congressional hearings as well as changing practices among congressional
committees. In Parts II and III, I attempt to make sense of the changing patterns in constitutional hearings. Part II discusses the decline in constitutional hearings outside the Judiciary Committees. Part II explains in part
how party polarization contributes to Congress’s increasing focus on policy
issues though not to the constitutional underpinnings of those policies. Part
II also explains why it is that committee interest in constitutional questions
varies over time and spurs occasional spikes in committee interest in constitutional questions. In Part III, I turn my attention to the Judiciary Committees and discuss why those committees continue to regularly hold
constitutional hearings.7 In the Conclusion, I summarize the Article’s
claims and offer a brief commentary about the future of constitutional hearings.
Before turning to the data, let me provide a quick explanation of why I
think it useful to study constitutional hearings this way. First, committees,
along with political parties, are one of the two “principal organizing structures of Congress.”8 And although the relative influence of committees and
5

For this reason, it is difficult to say with certainty why a particular issue is or is not pursued by a
committee. The explanations I offer should therefore be seen as informed guesses. That said, I think
this Article amasses sufficient information to support its conclusions: anyone who disagrees with my
claims should have the facts needed to advance a competing hypothesis.
6
Practices from 2007 roughly track the pattern of the period of unified Republican government
from 2001 to 2006, when there was a gradual dip in constitutional hearings. See infra Figures 1 and 3
and note 33 and accompanying text. Data from 2009 largely follow data from the previous two years
and Administrations. See infra Figures 1 & 2. In sharp contrast, the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress was immediately transformative. See infra Figures 1 & 2 (documenting spike in 1995 hearings);
see also infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
7
At the same time, the Judiciary Committees are hardly immune to Part II factors that contribute to
the ebb and flow of constitutional hearings in Congress. For example, when constitutional issues are
more salient to the national policy agenda, the number of constitutional hearings increases throughout
Congress—so that the Judiciary Committees hold more constitutional hearings at the very time that other committees in Congress are holding more constitutional hearings. See infra Figures 5–7. Likewise,
party polarization helps shape the constitutional agendas of the Judiciary Committees. The choices of
which issues to pursue and of which witnesses to invite to testify are very much tied to party polarization. See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1539–45 (2005); see
also infra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the Judiciary Committees’ tendency since 1985
to call witnesses who back up policy preferences).
8
John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009).
Political parties are the other principal organizing structure of Congress. Id.
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political parties has varied over time, it has always been the case that
“[m]uch of the important work of Congress is done in committees.”9 “[T]he
connections between public attention and hearings, and between hearings
and statutes, strongly suggest the general sensitivity of the lawmaking
process to public priorities.”10 Hearings, moreover, are a relatively accessible source of information about Congress. Unlike informal contacts among
staffers, members, lobbyists, and agency officials, hearings are public
events. Recognizing their prominence and accessibility, political scientists
regularly use congressional hearings as a source from which to draw insight
into legislative priorities and practices.11
None of this is to say that hearings are a perfect measure of congressional interest in a subject. For example, it is increasingly true that much
congressional business, including congressional consideration of constitutional questions, is done “without the benefit of hearings . . . [or even] deliberation in committee.”12 This is particularly true today; reductions in
committee staff and the shift from party leader control to centralized control
have diminished the overall importance of committee work.13 Furthermore,
rather than engage in public deliberations through hearings, committee staff
and members often deliberate and negotiate behind closed doors.14 Like9

Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in CONGRESS
87, 87 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
10
BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 263 (2005); accord id. at 258–63 (examining congruence between congressional agenda and policy, and policy priorities of the American people); David C. King,
The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 51 (1994) (discussing
committee jurisdiction and jurisdictional wrangling among committees); Roger Larocca, Committee
Parallelism and Bicameral Agenda Coordination, 38 AM. POL. RES. 3, 17 (2010) (noting that issues that
are high on the public agenda are more likely to be considered in hearings); Adam D. Sheingate, Structure and Opportunity: Committee Jurisdiction and Issue Attention in Congress, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 844,
847 (2006) (discussing the relationship between congressional politics and policy agendas, particularly
institutional effects on individual issues); Jeffery C. Talbert et al., Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy
Change in Congress, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383, 385–90 (1995) (discussing committee use of hearings to
control the content of legislation).
11
See Whittington, supra note 9, at 87–91 (detailing why political scientists study congressional
hearings and including citations to the literature).
12
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 217 (2006) (discussing congressional efforts to compel
federal court review of Terry Schiavo’s termination-of-life-support case).
13
See infra notes 62–84 and accompanying text (linking the declining status of committees to political polarization); infra note 105 and accompanying text (linking committee interest in the Constitution
to, among other things, the size of committee staff).
14
This has always been the case, but the prevalence of back-door negotiations may well be tied to
party polarization: polarization encourages behind-the-scenes negotiations among party members, who
typically present themselves as a unified front at hearings, on the floor of Congress, and so on. See infra
notes 71–73, 81, 133–34 (discussing efforts by party leaders to communicate a coordinated message);
infra notes 170–72 (discussing rise of party-line voting on judicial nominations). For additional discussion of party-line voting, see David M. Herszenhorn, In Health Vote, A New Vitriol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2009, at A1, which discusses party-line voting on health care legislation, and Richard Rubin, Party
AND THE CONSTITUTION
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wise, today’s hearings are increasingly “stage-managed”15 and “orchestrated
as a form of political theater.”16
But even if hearings play a less prominent role in congressional deliberations, it is nevertheless true that hearings remain one of the most visible
mechanisms for lawmakers to take “action in the public sphere.”17 “In hearings,” as Keith Whittington put it, “legislators put political relationships and
concerns on display and establish the warrants of authority for legislative
action.”18 Furthermore, for the purposes of this Article, differences in congressional practices over the past forty years will serve as a useful point of
reference in sorting out how party polarization has shaped congressional
consideration of constitutional issues. From 1970 to the 1980 election of
Ronald Reagan, Republicans and Democrats were not especially polarized;
from 1980 to the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, the ideological divide between the parties grew considerably. More recently, from 1995 to
2009, Democrats and Republicans have become more polarized than at any
other time in our nation’s history.19
I. DATA AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
With the help of my research assistant Nick Cumings, I collected data
on committee hearings in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate from January 1, 1970, to December 31, 2009. The Congressional Information Service (CIS) publishes abstracts and witness lists for the public
hearings held by congressional committees and subcommittees. CIS also
assigns subject terms to each hearing. Using an electronic version of the
CIS index, we searched for every entry in the database with any variation of
the word “Constitution”20 registered as a subject term. We then examined
the results for relevance: for example, we excluded entries referring to foreign constitutions or the testimony of constitutional law professors on isUnity: An Ever Thicker Dividing Line, 68 CQ WKLY. 122, 123 (2010), which notes that Democrats have
a 91% party-unity score and Republicans an 87% unity score. Furthermore, even when Congress holds
public hearings, much of the lawmaker and staff deliberation occurs outside of public view. For example, Senate Judiciary Committee members and their staff actively engage in conversations about federal
court of appeals nominees, including their likely rulings on highly charged constitutional issues. Telephone Interview with Michael Gerhardt, Special Counsel to Senate Judiciary Committee (June 23,
2010).
15
Richard E. Cohen, Crackup of the Committees, 31 NAT’L J. 2210, 2215 (1999).
16
ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 214 (11th ed. 2008);
see also Devins, supra note 7, at 1544.
17
Whittington, supra note 9, at 88 (quoting DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000)).
18
Id.; accord JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY, 1919–
1981, at 23 (1991) (“[H]earings often are less a forum for gathering information than a ritual for legitimizing decisions.”).
19
See infra Figure 8; see also infra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
20
We used the expander operator. Our search string was “constitution!”
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sues unrelated to the U.S. Constitution.21 We organized the data by calendar year and by committee in both the House and Senate. We recorded data
on total House and Senate hearings held in each year and total House and
Senate hearings held on the Constitution in each year to capture larger
trends in the number and overall percentage of constitutional hearings. We
also broke down the data for each year in both chambers by committee, revealing trends in each committee’s interest in constitutional issues.22
21

This methodology largely mirrors the methodology previously employed in the Constitution and
Congressional Committees book chapter. See Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at 398.
22
Although we think our data set is fairly complete, CIS did not use the “constitution” subject term
for some hearings that, in fact, did pay substantial attention to constitutional issues. For example, some
constitutionally related confirmation hearings were not included in our data set, as I will soon explain.
Also, we needed to make several judgment calls about whether a hearing actually featured the Constitution in some meaningful way. That said, the data set that I used “is likely to capture a large proportion
of the relevant universe and [is otherwise] broadly representative.” Id.
I have two other comments about the data set: First, rather than simply supplement the data set used
in Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, this data set is entirely new. We did this because we
could not exactly replicate the numbers from the Constitution and Congressional Committees project.
This could be a result of possible additions of new hearings by the LexisNexis database over the past
several years or, alternatively, the use of the subject term “constitution” in this piece is potentially
broader than “constitutional law,” the subject term used in the earlier piece. Some differences might also have occurred due to differences in judgment by individuals collecting data as to which hearings related substantively to the Constitution.
Second, Judicial and Executive Branch confirmation hearings often use the subject terms “nominations” as well as the name of the position that an individual is nominated for. A federal district court
judge, for example, would also have “judges” and “federal district court” as subject terms. Many hearings in which the words “constitution” or “constitutional” are mentioned ten or more times in testimony
or prepared statements are excluded from a search that makes use of the “constitutional” subject term.
That is not to say that there is substantial attention to constitutional issues in all of these hearings because just two or three questions or answers over the course of a hearing may result in ten references to
the Constitution—references to the Constitution may be made in submitted testimony without being pursued at the hearing itself, and several nominees may be under consideration at a single hearing so that no
individual nominee is meaningfully questioned about constitutional issues. And our data set should not
be seen as including every single hearing in which constitutional issues were aired in a meaningful way.
Nonetheless, the omission of some hearings does not undermine this Article’s central findings about the
frequency and location of constitutional hearings over time. The fact that some relevant hearings are not
included will be true of all years covered in the study; the larger patterns identified in this Article still
hold true.
Furthermore, as I discuss infra note 195, my examination of confirmation hearings in which the
words “constitution” or “constitutional” were mentioned ten or more times reinforces the central claims
in this Article about the impact of party polarization on congressional consideration of constitutional issues. In particular, there were more confirmation hearings that considered constitutional questions in the
less polarized period from 1970 to 1989 than in the more polarized period from 1990 to 2009, notwithstanding the fact that increases in the size of the government created more opportunities for the Senate to
pursue constitutional questions in the post-1990 period. During the period from 1970 to 1989, there
were 72 constitutional confirmation hearings outside of the Judiciary Committee, and from 1990 to
2009, there were 39 constitutional confirmation hearings outside of the Judiciary Committee. This fact
speaks to an inverse relationship between party polarization and lawmaker interest in constitutional
questions. For a detailed statement of the methodology employed in calculating these numbers, see infra note 195. On the other hand, as I also discuss infra note 195, the Senate Judiciary Committee held
significantly more constitutional confirmation hearings from 1990 to 2009 than from 1970 to 1989. This
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The data set includes 2214 hearings—944 were held in the Senate and
1270 in the House. Figure 1 details the number of constitutional hearings
per year in Congress as well as the number in each chamber. Figure 2 details the percentage of constitutional hearings in each chamber of Congress.
Figure 3 details the overall percentage of constitutional hearings in Congress. Figure 3 sets out the puzzle that I try to sort through in Part II of this
Article.
FIGURE 1: HEARINGS ON CONSTITUTION OVER TIME
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FIGURE 2: PERCENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS BY CHAMBER
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speaks to the Judiciary Committee’s continuing interest in the Constitution and, with it, the Judiciary
Committee’s growing dominion over constitutional hearings throughout the past 25 years.
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FIGURE 3: COMBINED PERCENTAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS
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To start, the frequency of constitutional hearings and the comparative
percentage of such hearings varies from year to year. There are numerous
peaks and valleys. Yet there is little question that the pace of constitutional
hearings has slowed somewhat since 1990, especially if, as Figure 4 reveals, the spike years associated with the 1995 Republican takeover of
Congress are not considered.
FIGURE 4: COMBINED PERCENTAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS,
OMITTING 1995
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In Part II of this Article, I explain how party polarization contributes to
declining congressional interest in constitutional questions (or, more precisely, how party polarization has changed congressional practices in ways
that have depressed lawmaker interest in constitutional hearings). More
generally, Part II identifies a range of factors that contribute to the holding
of constitutional hearings and, in so doing, suggests that it is inevitable that
congressional interest in constitutional questions ebbs and flows over the
744
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years.23 In identifying the sources of both general trends and year-to-year
variances, Part II demonstrates that constitutional hearings are part and parcel of the normal tugs and pulls of congressional politics. That said, Congress’s interest in holding constitutional hearings does not seem tied to
which party controls Congress, whether there is unified or divided government, or whether there is a change in party control of Congress.24 None of
these partisan factors reliably signals greater or lesser lawmaker interest in
holding constitutional hearings.25
Consider, for example, the impact of whether there is unified or divided government: from 1970 to 2009, the president and House of Representatives were unified for 13 years and divided for 27 years. During this
time, the average number of constitutional hearings in the House during periods of unified government was 30, and the average number during periods
of divided government was 32.26 In the Senate, the government was unified
for 17 years and divided for 23 years. The average number of constitutional
hearings during periods of unified government was 25, and the average
number during periods of divided government was 22.27 Moreover, there
are significant variances during each presidential administration, and the
presence of unified or divided government does not appear to push the
number or percentages of constitutional hearings up or down during a particular administration.28 During the Administrations of Ronald Reagan, Bill

23

In the House, the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress prompted lawmakers to rethink the
boundaries of federal–state authority. For additional discussion, see infra note 33 and accompanying
text. In the Senate, judicial confirmations were especially politically heated in 1987, and as a result, the
Senate held several constitutionally related judicial confirmation hearings. There were therefore more
Senate constitutional hearings in 1987 than 1986. Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, for
example, generated five volumes of published Senate hearings. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987). See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989) (exploring the Bork nomination and the political struggle it engendered in the Senate).
24
For additional discussion, see Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at 401–02.
25
On occasion, these partisan factors are highly salient, and in Part II, I discuss one such occasion:
the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress. Overall, however, none of these factors seems significant in
identifying patterns in the number of constitutional hearings.
26
See supra Figure 1 (identifying the number of constitutional hearings in the House and Senate
from 1970 to 2009). Calculations were made by totaling all House hearings during periods of unified
and divided government and dividing the unified-government total by 13 and the divided-government
total by 27.
27
See supra Figure 1 (identifying the number of constitutional hearings in the House and Senate
from 1970 to 2009). Calculations were made by totaling all Senate hearings during periods of unified
and divided government and dividing the unified-government total by 17 and the divided-government
total by 23.
28
I mention this because averages are arguably misleading. For example, 6 of the 13 years that the
House was unified occurred during the George W. Bush Administration, a time when there were fewer
constitutional hearings than in any time from 1970 to 2000.
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Clinton, and George W. Bush, variations in the number of constitutional
hearings did not track shifts from unified to divided government.29
Likewise, there is no obvious correlation between changes in party
control and the number of constitutional hearings. When a unified Democratic government gave way to divided government in 1995, there was a
dramatic short-term spike in constitutional hearings.30 However, when a
unified Republican government gave way to divided government after the
2006 elections, the number of constitutional hearings dropped in both the
House and Senate.31 Moreover, when a divided government gave way to a
unified Democratic government after the 2008 elections, the number of
constitutional hearings remained constant. 32 This variable impact does not
mean that shifts from unified to divided government are irrelevant.33 It does
indicate, though, that other factors must be at play.34
Similarly, the frequency of constitutional hearings does not seem tied
to which party controls Congress. Because Democrats controlled both
houses of Congress during the 1970s, when there was lower polarization
and more constitutional hearings, and Republicans largely controlled in the
post-1995 period, when there was higher polarization and fewer constitutional hearings,35 the average number of constitutional hearings was higher
for years in which the Democrats were in control.36 But by averaging hearings held in four-year clusters of the last two years in which one party controlled the House or Senate and the first two years in which the other party
controlled the House or Senate, the gap between Republicans and Demo29

See supra Figures 1, 3 & 4 (documenting shifts from unified to divided government in 1981,
1983, 1995, and 2007). For additional discussion, see infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
30
See supra Figure 1.
31
See supra Figure 1.
32
See supra Figure 1.
33
For example, the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress triggered a spike in constitutional hearings because the Republican Party agenda focused on constitutional issues such as federal–state relations. See supra Figures 1 & 2; see also Whittington, supra note 9, at 93–94 (discussing the spike in
constitutionally oriented committee hearings following Newt Gingrich’s assumption of the speakership).
34
See Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at 402 (contending that changes in party control
in the Senate in 1981, 1987, and 1995 did not significantly impact the number of constitutional hearings
held). Consider, for example, the 1987 fight over the Bork confirmation. The Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987, but the power shift did not cause the confirmation battle. Instead, it took
place because Justice Lewis Powell retired from the Court and Ronald Reagan nominated Robert Bork
to fill the vacant seat. Yet if Republicans had maintained control of the Senate, Bork and other related
battles would have played out differently—thus impacting the number of constitutional hearings held
that year.
35
Figure 8, infra, illustrates dramatic differences in party polarization between the 1970s and the
post-1995 period.
36
In the House, for example, the average number for Democrat control is 35 and Republican control
is 25. This number reflects the fact that Republicans controlled the House for 12 of the 14 high polarization years and Democrats controlled the House throughout the period from 1970 to 1994. In the Senate,
the average number is 21 in Republican years and 26 in Democratic years. The Senate range is closer
because Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 to 1986. See supra Figure 1.
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crats disappeared.37 In fact, Republicans in both the House and Senate held
somewhat more hearings than did their Democratic counterparts in the two
years immediately before or after party turnovers in Congress.38 It therefore
seems likely that differences between Democratic and Republican numbers
are tied to the overall decline in constitutional hearings—a downward trend
for most of the past two decades, during periods of both Democratic and
Republican control and during periods of unified and divided government.
Correspondingly, the number of constitutional hearings in the House and
Senate varied under both Democratic and Republican control so that each
party presided over constitutional hearings during spike years and during
lull years.
Needless to say, the questions of which party is in control of Congress
and whether the government is unified or divided are critically important to
the types of issues that Congress considers in constitutional hearings.
Democrats are more apt to hold hearings on separation of powers and civil
rights and liberties; Republicans put more emphasis on federalism and constitutional amendments.39 When Congress is unified, moreover, majority
party lawmakers do not seek to cast doubt on the constitutionality of presidential initiatives; when Congress is divided, majority party lawmakers are
far more likely to question the constitutionality of presidential initiatives.40

37

In looking at four-year blocks in which each party controlled Congress for two of those years, I
was able to answer the following question: were differences between the average number of hearings
held by Democrats and Republicans tied to party differences or, instead, tied to historical periods? If
Democrats consistently held more hearings, the Democratic Party would be more interested in constitutional hearings than Republicans. On the other hand, if Republicans held as many hearings as Democrats during these four-year blocks, differences in party averages would seem tied to historical periods.
That latter explanation, of course, is what the data show—suggesting that the frequency of constitutional
hearings is tied more to historical periods than to which party controls Congress. See supra Figure 1.
38
In the Senate, the average was 21 when Republicans controlled the Senate and 26 when Democrats controlled the Senate. In the House, the average was 25 when Republicans controlled the House
and 35 when Democrats controlled the House. See supra Figure 1 and note 36.
39
See Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at 402. On the related issue of how Democrats
and Republicans send out competing constitutional messages, see infra notes 133–34134 and accompanying text.
40
For example, when Democrats regained control of Congress in 2007, lawmakers held hearings to
question the constitutionality of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror initiatives. Examples include
Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of the National Applications Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th
Cong. (2007); Upholding the Principle of Habeas Corpus for Detainees: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 110th Cong. (2007); Habeas Corpus and Detentions at Guantanamo Bay: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007); and Restoring Habeas Corpus: Protecting American Values and the Great Writ: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). For a related argument, see Ilya Somin &
Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More Democratic?, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 971, 986–87
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These factors do not, however, illuminate the broader question about the
decline of constitutional hearings.
Unlike party identity, changes in party control, and the unification of
the government, party polarization seems especially salient in understanding the downward trend of constitutional hearings. Before turning to my
explanation of why that is so,41 let me highlight the transformative effect of
party polarization on the location of constitutional hearings.42
Figures 5 and 6 map the number of House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on constitutional issues relative to the number of constitutional hearings in the House and Senate. Figure 7 charts the ever-increasing
percentage of constitutional hearings held in the Judiciary Committees.
And while the Judiciary Committees have always held more constitutional
hearings than any other committee, there is no question that there is a positive correlation between declining committee interest in constitutional questions and Judiciary Committee dominion over constitutional hearings. In
the 1970s, for example, constitutional hearings were held throughout Congress—thus, a downturn did not result in the Judiciary Committees holding
the vast majority of constitutional hearings. Instead, a spike or a downturn
simply spoke to the number of constitutional hearings held in a given year,
and the Judiciary Committees simply mirrored the larger congressional
trends. Starting around 1995, however, the Judiciary Committees were the
only committees to regularly consider constitutional questions. Although
Judiciary Committee numbers have increased in spike years and decreased
in downturn years, the pattern of numerous committees holding constitutional hearings has given way to a pattern in which the Judiciary Committees are the only committees to regularly consider constitutional issues.
Unless there was a spike in constitutional hearings like the spikes in 1995,
1997, and 2005, very few constitutional hearings were held outside of the
Judiciary Committees. Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate this shift and highlight
both the significant difference between Judiciary Committee totals and congressional totals in the 1970s, as well as the post-1995 pattern in which
meaningful difference between the Judiciary Committees and other committees only exists in years when there was a spike in congressional interest in
the Constitution. Figures 5 and 6 suggest that party polarization is instrumental in understanding this shift.

(2007), which highlights the relationship between unified and divided government and congressional
oversight of the executive.
41
See infra Part II.
42
See infra Part III.
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FIGURE 7: PERCENTAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS HELD BY THE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
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Figure 8 highlights the dramatic upswing in party polarization the past
forty years. From 1970 to 1980, Congress was not especially polarized
along party lines, but from 1980 to 1994, party polarization increased. Following the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, party polarization was
deeply entrenched and growing—so much so that scholars began talking
about the “separation of parties, not powers.”43 Figures 9 through 12 compare changes in party polarization to the distribution of constitutional hearings—looking at House and Senate combined totals. Figures 9 through 12
reveal dramatic shifts in this distribution during the periods from 1970 to
1980, from 1981 to 1994, and from 1995 to 2009.44 During the 1970s, Judiciary Committees held 46% of all constitutional hearings, during the period
from 1980 to 1994, that number had risen to 56%, from 1995 to 2009, the
Judiciary Committees heard 72% of constitutional hearings (75% if the
spike year of 1995 is not considered).45

43

Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311 (2006).
44
My decision to divide hearing data into the periods from 1970 to 1980, from 1981 to 1994, and
from 1995 to 2009 roughly tracks the periods identified by John Aldrich and David Rohde. Aldrich and
Rohde divided the current partisan era into three periods: 1970 to 1982, 1983 to 1994, and post-1995.
See Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 220–22.
45
See supra Figures 9–12. Although I highlight the role of party polarization in the changing patterns of constitutional hearings, I am not suggesting that other factors are not also at play. Consider, for
example, that the Judiciary Committee percentage leveled off in the House after Democrats regained
control in the late 2000s. See supra Figure 7. On the one hand, unlike House Republicans in 1995, the
House Democrats in 2007 did not deploy numerous committees to advance a constitutional agenda
throughout Congress, which speaks to partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans. On the
other hand, the 1995 Republican takeover of the Senate did not meaningfully impact the number of constitutional hearings. For additional discussion of the 2007 Democratic takeover, see infra notes 166, 206
and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 8: PARTY POLARIZATION 1879–201046

FIGURE 9: CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS BY COMMITTEE, 1970–1980
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This chart is used with permission. For more information, see POLARIZED AMERICA, http://
polarizedamerica.com (last visited July 7, 2011). See also NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE &
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA (2006).
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FIGURE 10: CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS BY COMMITTEE, 1981–1994
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FIGURE 12: CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS BY COMMITTEE, 1995–2009,
EXCLUDING THE SPIKE OF 1995
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Part III addresses the question of why the Judiciary Committees regularly interpret the Constitution while other committees that had once regularly considered constitutional questions, such as the Foreign Relations,
Education, and Labor Committees, have now ceded constitutional expertise
to the Judiciary Committees. In so doing, I explain why the Judiciary
Committees now dominate constitutional hearings, and I detail the consequences of party polarization on the constitutional hearings that Congress
holds, such as topics pursued and witnesses invited.47 I now turn to Part II
and the related question of why most congressional committees are holding
fewer and fewer constitutional hearings. In answering this question, I link
party polarization to the decline in constitutional hearings.
II. HOW PARTY POLARIZATION CONTRIBUTES TO THE DECLINE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS
Today’s Congress is much different than the Congress of 1970.48 In
1968, for example, Democrats occupied every ideological niche and there
were several liberal Republicans.49 Throughout the 1970s, there was no
meaningful gap in the median liberal–conservative scores of the two par47

Part III builds upon a very brief discussion of this issue in Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra
note 2, at 405–08.
48
Portions of the following two paragraphs are drawn from Devins, supra note 7, at 1534–37.
49
See supra Figure 8 (documenting comparatively low party polarization throughout the 1960s and
1970s); see also Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and
Member Adaptation, 12 PARTY POL. 483, 484 (2006); Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing
Moderates: Party Polarization in the Modern Congress 6 figs. 1 & 2 (Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.msu.edu/~rohde/Theriault.pdf [hereinafter Theriault, Vanishing Moderates]. For
a general discussion of party polarization since the early 1970s, see SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY
POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008) [hereinafter THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION].
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ties.50 For this reason, George Wallace justified his third-party bid for the
presidency in 1968 by claiming that there was not a “dime’s worth of difference” between Democrats and Republicans.51 Today, however, the
forces that pushed the Democratic and Republican parties toward the center
have disappeared. The liberal “Rockefeller Republicans” and conservative
“Southern Democrats” have given way to an era of ideological polarization
in Congress.52
After Ronald Reagan’s 1980 victory, the moderate-to-liberal wing of
the Republican Party began to dissipate. Not only did “Ronald Reagan’s
GOP” pursue a conservative agenda, but congressional redistricting also
marginalized centrist voters in both the Democratic and Republican Parties.
In particular, computer-driven redistricting resulted in the drawing of district lines that essentially guaranteed that each party would win particular
seats in the House of Representatives.53 In so doing, Democratic and Republican candidates sought to mobilize the more partisan bases that vote in
party primaries, pushing moderates out and rewarding candidates who were
both more ideological and more loyal to their parties.54 By 1990, Congress
was transformed; the sharp gap between Northern and Southern members of
each party had largely disappeared, replaced by a sharp and ever-growing
divide between the parties.55 Throughout the 1990s, this divide grew, especially in the Senate, where both conservative “Gingrich Senators” and liberal “Gephardt allies” had come to the Senate from the House.56 In 2004,
50

See Steven S. Smith & Gerald Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 8, at 141, 147 fig.7-2, 151 fig.7-4.
51
Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at A1.
52
See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional
Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 305, 306 (2003)
(tracking in particular the rapid growth of Southern Republicans).
53
See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 428–31 (2004); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459,
477–78 (2004).
54
For example, Karl Rove, an advisor to President George W. Bush, attributed the electoral success
of Republicans to the Party’s efforts to bring religious conservatives to the polls. See Jeffrey Toobin,
Ashcroft’s Ascent, NEW YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50, 63; cf. Morris P. Fiorina, Whatever Happened to
the Median Voter? 16–18 (Oct. 2, 1999) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the MIT Conference on
Parties and Congress), http://www.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/Fiorina%20Web%20Files/MedianVoterPaper
.pdf (noting that the greatest increase in polarization is in caucus and party primary elections). On the
linkage between ideology and party loyalty, see Roberts & Smith, supra note 52, at 313. See also infra
notes 140, 198–200 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Republican ties to social conservatives on the types of constitutional hearings held in the House of Representatives).
55
See Roberts & Smith, supra note 52, at 306.
56
See THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION, supra note 49, at 205, 211 (discussing Gingrich Senators); C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
220 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (discussing Gephardt Senators);
see also THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION, supra note 49, at 202 (noting that the 1990s saw “an influx
of ideologically committed conservatives into the Senate, with many of them being veterans of the highly partisan house” (quoting BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 75 (3d ed. 2007))); Alan I. Abramowitz, Party Realignment, Ideolog-
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measures of ideology revealed that the “two parties are perfectly separated
in the liberal-conservative ordering.”57 At that time, there was only one
Democrat in either the House or Senate who was more conservative than
the most liberal Republican in the respective chamber.58 By 2009, the distance between the two parties was greater than any time since Reconstruction.59
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that “[t]he polarization between the legislative parties is, perhaps, one of the most obvious and recognizable trends in Congress during the last [twenty-five] years.”60 In this
Part, I call attention to factors which help explain why very few congressional committees are interested in holding constitutional hearings and how
it is that party polarization contributed to declining congressional interest in
constitutional hearings. My analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I proical Polarization, and Voting Behavior in U.S. Senate Elections, in U.S. SENATE EXCEPTIONALISM 31,
32 (Bruce I. Oppenheimer ed., 2002) (noting that party cohesion and party-line voting increased substantially during the 1990s).
57
See 108th House Rank Ordering, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/hou108.htm (last updated
Aug. 25, 2005). For an article explaining the methodology employed in these rankings, see Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, D-NOMINATE After 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political–Economic History of Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2001).
58
108th Senate Rank Ordering, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/sen108.htm (last updated
Oct. 26, 2004). The Democrat was Georgia Senator Zell Miller. Id.
59
See Party Polarization: 1879–2010, POLARIZED AMERICA, http://polarizedamerica.com (last updated Jan. 11, 2011). Polarization was also fueled by changes in federal regulatory policy, most notably
the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, and the proliferation of media outlets that allowed conservative and liberal audiences to get their news and opinion programming from stations that reinforced their
political beliefs. The repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, as Cass Sunstein observed, “produced a flowering
of controversial substantive programming, frequently with an extreme view of one kind or another” and,
in so doing, “create[d] group polarization, and all too many people . . . exposed to louder echoes of their
own voices, resulting in social fragmentation, enmity, and misunderstanding.” Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 101–02 (2000); see also Thomas W.
Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 295 (1997) (noting dramatic increase in informational
programming on AM radio).
In particular, Pew Research Center polls revealed that, in 2004, George W. Bush outpolled John
Kerry 70% to 21% among Fox viewers but that Kerry outpolled Bush 67% to 26% among CNN viewers.
Dan Bernhardt et al., Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias, 92 J. PUB. ECON.
1092, 1092–93 (2008). Likewise, Republicans account for only 24% of NPR listeners whereas Democrats account for only 28% of listeners to talk radio, and self-identified liberals account for just 18% of
radio listeners. News Release, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Online News Audiences Larger, More Diverse: News Audiences Increasingly Politicized 8 (June 8, 2004) (on file with
author). These data back up the claim that the proliferation of media outlets—cable television, radio,
and the Internet—feeds polarization by creating markets for niche audiences; by way of contrast, “[i]f
this change in the parties had occurred half a century ago, the dominant news media might have moderated polarizing tendencies because of their interest in appealing to a mass audience that crossed ideological lines. But the incentives have changed: on cable, talk radio, and the Internet, partisanship pays.”
Paul Starr, Governing in the Age of Fox News, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 95, 98.
60
Theriault, Vanishing Moderates, supra note 49, at 5. Theriault’s data covered the twenty-year period from 1986 to 2006. The trend has continued since. See Party Polarization: 1879–2010, supra note
59.
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vide an overview of the ways that party polarization has fundamentally
transformed the balance of power within Congress by shifting power away
from committees and toward party leaders interested in advancing a coordinated party message. I also discuss congressional interest in the Constitution, that is, how lawmakers are more interested in advancing favored
policies than in thinking about the Constitution. Second, I explain how
these phenomena have contributed to a decline in the number of constitutional hearings—so that, with the important exception of the Judiciary
Committees, all committees now hold fewer constitutional hearings. I focus on various factors that contribute to the supply of constitutional hearings in Congress. I also suggest that party polarization has changed
Congress in ways that cut against the holding of constitutional hearings by
committees other than the Judiciary Committees. Third, I talk about why
the number of constitutional hearings is nevertheless variable—that is, why
the general downward trend is punctuated by spikes in certain years. In particular, I discuss how exogenous factors, such as court decisions, presidential action, and changes in the national policy agenda, impact the demand
for constitutional hearings.61
A. Parties, Committees, and Congressional Leadership: How Party
Polarization Transformed Congress
Starting in the 1970s and especially in the wake of the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, party leaders have pursued institutional reforms
intended to shift the balance of legislative power from committee chairs to
party leaders. These reforms track growing homogeneity within the parties.
“As the views of members within the majority party become more alike, the
costs of [members] delegating positive agenda power [to the majority party
leadership] diminishes relative to the potential benefits.”62 In this way,
“party influence varies with party polarization” because the willingness of
party members to prefer centralized leadership to a more decentralized system is tied both to the cohesiveness within a party and the ideological distance between parties.63
In the 1970s, younger party loyalists pursued reforms that sought to
limit the prerogatives of committee chairs. They did so due in part to the
waning influence of Southern Democrats, several of whom were prominent

61

Thanks to Steve Smith for suggesting that I think about changing patterns in constitutional hearings as a question of supply and demand.
62
David W. Rohde et al., Parties, Committees, and Pivots: A Reassessment of the Literature on
Congressional Organization 12 (Aug. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the 2008 American Political Science Association Meeting), http://research.allacademic.com (select “Titles” from the
drop down box and search for “Parties, Committees, and Pivots” from the “Quick Search” box on the
main page; then find the APSA presentation and follow the link entitled “Application/PDF”).
63
STEVEN S. SMITH, PARTY INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS 120 (2007).
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committee chairs.64 For example, the so-called Subcommittee Bill of Rights
prevented committee chairs from naming subcommittee chairs and empowered subcommittees to operate in a somewhat autonomous manner.65 During the 1980s, reform strategies were pursued to bolster Democratic Party
leadership in the House. In particular, with party polarization narrowing the
ideological gap among party members, committee and party leaders increasingly saw themselves as part of a team66—a team at odds with Republicans
in general and President Reagan in particular.67
The most dramatic reforms took place in 1995, part of the “Gingrich
Revolution” that further transformed a sharply polarized Congress. Immediately after assuming power, the Republican Congress adopted “landmark
rule[] changes” that centralized power in party leadership.68 In the House of
Representatives, Speaker Newt Gingrich took control of the committee system. He bypassed seniority and appointed ideologically simpatico committee chairs.
He then gutted subcommittee autonomy, empowering
handpicked committee chairs to name subcommittee chairs and control
committee staff.69 To further ensure committee loyalty to majority leadership, House Republicans adopted a six-year term limit for committee
chairs.70 In so doing, committee chairs could not establish an independent
power base that might vary from leadership preferences.71 House Republicans also approved measures that would limit committee autonomy such as
reducing staff size by one-third.72 Leadership also seized control of committee jurisdiction through changes in the referral system. Under new
House rules, the Speaker would designate a primary committee of his
choosing and would also have significant flexibility in determining wheth64

Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 219–20.
Id. at 220.
66
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA 164 (1995); Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 221; Barbara Sinclair, The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives, 54 J. POL. 657,
668 (1992) [hereinafter Sinclair, Strong Leadership].
67
Sinclair, Strong Leadership, supra note 66, at 671–72.
68
CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 48 (3d ed. 1997).
Most of these changes affected the House of Representatives. See id. at 49 (identifying major House
and Senate reforms in 1995).
69
See Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 223. Republicans also centralized control in party leadership by eliminating thirty-one subcommittees—so that it would be easier for the committee chair and
party leadership to control committee business. See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 48–50.
70
Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 223.
71
At the same time, committee chairs did not always do the bidding of party leadership, and as
such, party leaders sometimes bypassed the committee process to advance their agenda. See SINCLAIR,
supra note 56, at 132 (discussing House Speaker Dennis Hastert’s convening of a party task force to sidestep committee control over the 1999 Patient Bill of Rights).
72
Between 1993 and 1995, House committee staff was reduced from 2147 to 1266. See NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 2008, at 110 tbl.5-1 (2008). For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying note 105.
65
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er, when, and how long additional panels would receive legislation.73 In so
doing, rival committee chairs would not lay claim to the same issue—
expanding their own power at the expense of leadership preferences.74
In the Senate, committees and parties “have been institutionally weaker
than their House counterparts, and individual senators have been more consequential.”75 Nevertheless, “Polarization has made participation through
their parties more attractive to senators than it was when the parties were
more heterogeneous and the ideological distance between them less.”76
Correspondingly, the “mobilization of Senate parties over the past 25 years
has coincided with systematic changes in the Senate roll call agenda.”77 In
particular, party leaders fueled polarization by seeking roll call votes on the
very issues that are likely to divide the parties.78
The Senate has also adopted institutional reforms that shift power to
party leaders, including term limits on committee chairs.79 Party leaders in
both the House and Senate also sought to centralize leadership by using party caucuses, task forces, and other techniques to shape the party’s agenda.80
These efforts are often tied to “message politics”—party efforts to use the
legislative process to make symbolic statements to voters and other constituents.81 Rather than allow decentralized committees to define Congress’s
agenda, Democrats and Republicans alike see the lawmaking process as a
way to distinguish each party from the other.
Over fifteen years have now passed since the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress. During that time, Republicans and Democrats, especially
in the House, have both largely adhered to rule changes that limited committee prerogatives to take positions and pursue initiatives that do not match
leadership preferences. None of the significant authority granted to the Republican House leadership was rescinded during the post-Gingrich era,
73

See Lawrence C. Evans & Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Tsunami? Institutional Change in
the 104th Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 193 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer
eds., 6th ed. 1997).
74
See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION
113–16 (1997) (discussing referrals to multiple committees).
75
Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 228.
76
Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 393 (2009).
77
FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S.
SENATE 174 (2009).
78
See id. at 174, 178–80 (noting that the roll call agenda now focuses on the sorts of economic issues that will likely produce cleavage between the two parties). For discussion of why Senate leaders
pursue roll call votes that divide the parties, see supra note 59, which suggests that changes in federal
regulation and technology fuel polarization, and infra text accompanying notes 79–82, which explains
how polarization expands the power base of party leaders.
79
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 51–52.
80
See SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUSES IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 87–92
(1998).
81
See Evans, supra note 56, at 219.
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from 1999 to 2006.82 Following the 2007 Democratic takeover of Congress,
House Democrats also embraced a rules package that protected leadership
prerogatives. In the Senate, party polarization manifests itself less through
rule changes and more through party-line voting. Examples abound, but the
most notable is the power of the minority party to stand together and use its
filibuster power to block the majority’s legislative initiatives. Since sometime between 1993 and 1998, “about half of all major legislation was subject to filibusters or threatened filibusters,”83 and that pattern continued even
after the Democratic takeover of Congress in 2007.84
The ability of lawmakers to enact major legislation, leadership prerogatives, congressional committee staffing, and message politics all affect
the balance of power between parties and committees. Before I explore the
ways in which party polarization has contributed to a decline in the number
of congressional committees that regularly hold constitutional hearings, I
think it useful to say a few words about lawmaker interest in constitutional
questions.
B. Gauging Congressional Interest in the Constitution
Members of Congress have numerous goals, including winning reelection, making good public policy, and gaining the respect of their col82

See Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 8, at 232–37.
Smith & Gamm, supra note 50, at 161. For additional examples of party-line voting, see supra
note 14 and infra note 171 and accompanying text, which discuss minority party efforts to block judicial
nominations.
84
This pattern continued through 2009 as the Republican Party vigorously opposed Democratic legislation advanced by the Obama Administration. The 110th Congress saw a record 52 filibusters, a
marked increase from the 36 filibusters in the previous Congress. Barbara Sinclair, The New World of
U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 8, at 1, 8. During this same period, from 2007
to 2008, there were 139 cloture votes to end filibusters. Senator Thomas R. Harkin, 2010 Living Constitution Lecture at Brennan Center for Justice, Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority Tyranny in the Senate (June 21, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/filibuster_reform_
curbing_abuse_to_prevent_minority_tyranny_in_the_sen. In the 111th Congress, from January 2009 to
June 14, 2010, there were 98 cloture votes. Id. “The sense of institutional stalemate,” according to a
February 2010 Congressional Quarterly report, “has been underscored by the rapid increase in the use of
delaying tactics by the minority party not only to stall major legislation and top-tier nominees but also
on matters once considered routine—essentially establishing a 60-vote threshold to advance almost any
piece of business that annoys someone willing to mount a filibuster.” Joseph J. Shatz, No Winners in a
“Broken” Congress, 68 CQ WKLY. 434, 434 (2010); see also Rubin, supra note 14, at 122–23 (discussing Republican efforts to make the threat of filibuster routine for most Democratic legislation). After
the 2010 elections, there is good reason to think that this pattern of party-line voting and congressional
stalemate will continue. Republicans now hold 47 Senate seats and have gained control of the House,
increasing the power of each party to block the legislative initiatives of the other. It is likely that Democrats and Republicans will exercise this power. More than any election before it, the 2010 elections
made clear that “the single most significant fact about American politics over the last generation is the
emergence of hyperpolarized political parties.” Rick Pildes, Political Polarization and the Nationalization
for
Congressional
Elections,
BALKINIZATION (Nov.
4,
2010,
7:51
AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/11/political-polarization-and.html; see also Charles M. Blow, Op–Ed.,
The Great American Cleaving, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, at A23.
83
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leagues.85 In pursuing these goals, lawmakers have little interest in constitutional interpretation for its own sake. As Beth Garrett and Adrian
Vermeule have argued, constitutional interpretation is the type of “public
good” that is likely to be shortchanged by the legislative process.86 Lawmakers, for example, prioritize “fundraising, casework, media appearances,
and obtaining particularized spending projects in [their] district[s]” over
“analyzing constitutional questions[] and working with specialized personal
staff on constitutional issues.”87 Lawmakers, moreover, look to party leaders in sorting out whether to support a measure.88
Lawmakers’ comments about Congress’s role in interpreting the Constitution bear this out. Here are two examples taken from Mitch Pickerill’s
exhaustive study of constitutional deliberation in Congress: One Senator
told Pickerill, “Policy issue first, how do you get a consensus to pass the
bill, six other things, then constitutionality.”89 A member of the House was
even blunter, saying, “When I go home and talk to my constituents, they
ask me to help solve problems in Congress. They don’t ask if it’s constitutional.”90 Based on these comments and others, Pickerill concluded that
lawmakers “first take their position on legislation based on their policy preferences, and then use all arguments possible to support that position.”91
When advancing a positive legislative agenda, they rarely have a reason to
discuss potential constitutional limitations. “[T]he constitutional principles
involved in a bill, unlike its merits, are generally abstract, unpopular, and
fail to capture the imagination of either the media or the public. The Constitution is often portrayed as an obstacle to a better society by CongressFor this very reason,
men forced to confront its limitations.”92
constitutional arguments are typically made by lawmakers who oppose a
measure.93 But Congress will not necessarily hold constitutional hearings to
air constitutional objections. A bill may never get to committee because the

85

See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973); DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 16 (1974).
86
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1277, 1300–01 (2001).
87
Id. at 1301.
88
See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 587, 609 (1983).
89
J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 134 (2004).
90
Id.; see also Keith E. Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1137, 1154 (2005) (reviewing PICKERILL, supra note 89) (noting Pickerill’s conclusions on the demise
of constitutional deliberation). For reasons I detail infra notes 104–30130 and accompanying text, party
polarization fuels these attitudes by making it more likely that legislators will care more about party policy than about the Constitution.
91
PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 143–44.
92
Mikva, supra note 88, at 609–10.
93
See PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 142–43.
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majority disapproves of it, or if the majority approves of the bill, the minority may not have control of what issues the committee will discuss.94
Congress’s interest in independently interpreting the Constitution is also constricted by “judicial overhang,” the tendency of lawmakers to punt
constitutional questions to the courts.95 “Knowing the courts are available
to correct (some of) their constitutional errors, legislators have little incentive to expend great effort in enacting only constitutionally permissible statutes.”96 For example, when casting his vote in support of the habeas
stripping provisions of the Military Commission Act, Senator Arlen Specter
“told reporters that he was sure that ‘the courts would “clean it up.”’”97
More to the point, unless the Supreme Court is regularly frustrating the
first-order policy preferences of lawmakers or the preferences of voters, interest groups, and other constituents that lawmakers care about, lawmakers
have little reason to assert Congress’s institutional authority to independently interpret the Constitution.98
Congress, as former congressman and former D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva put it, is “designed to pass over the constitutional questions,
leaving the hard decisions to the courts.”99 Outside of the Judiciary Committees, where jurisdiction, constituent desires, and member preferences all
contribute to the holding of constitutional hearings, lawmakers typically
prefer to avoid constitutional questions.100 Because the “likelihood that a
particular statute will actually be reviewed and struck down by the Court is
relatively small,” the perceived threat of judicial invalidation “is likely to be
low.”101 Moreover, even when the Court invalidates a federal statute, Congress can typically find some way to enact follow-up legislation that generally advances lawmaker and constituent preferences—so that there is little
pressure to anticipate possible judicial invalidations of federal legislation.102

94

See infra notes 122–24124 and accompanying text (discussing these phenomena and attributing
them to party polarization).
95
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–60 (1999).
96
Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 499, 504 (2009). See generally TUSHNET, supra note 95 (discussing the intersection of constitutional theory and modern society).
97
Tushnet, supra note 96, at 499.
98
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 14–18 (2007).
99
Mikva, supra note 88, at 609. On the related question of whether Congress has the tools necessary to responsibly interpret the Constitution, see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985), which argues in favor of congressional capacity
100
See infra Part III.
101
PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 65.
102
For a general treatment of this issue, see id. at 31–61, which highlights the ability of lawmakers
to respond to Supreme Court invalidations of federal legislation without actually challenging Supreme
Court decisionmaking. I also have written on this topic, contrasting differences in lawmaker power to
respond to Supreme Court federalism and individual rights decisions. See Neal Devins, The Federalism-
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Finally, to the extent that lawmakers are interested in staking out positions
when holding hearings or voting on legislation, lawmakers may not care if
the Supreme Court invalidates their handiwork.103
None of this is at all surprising. Although each of the 535 members of
Congress has a stake in Congress’s institutional authority to independently
interpret the Constitution, parochial interests overwhelm this collective
good. Though speaking in a slightly different context, Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: Lawmakers are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or advancing
Congress’s power, but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of
the local constituency.”104 The question remains: Why is today’s Congress
less interested in holding constitutional hearings than earlier Congresses?
After all, much of the above discussion references longstanding congressional structures and incentives. But for reasons I now detail, party polarization and accompanying changes in the balance of power within Congress
have contributed to diminishing interest in holding constitutional hearings
by nearly all congressional committees.
C. Party Polarization and Diminishing Congressional Interest in Holding
Constitutional Hearings
No single factor explains either the general decline in constitutional
hearings outside the Judiciary Committees or the noticeable year-to-year
variations in the number and percentage of constitutional hearings. Nevertheless, there is good reason to attribute the decline in constitutional hearings to party polarization. Party polarization has contributed to message
politics, the rise in leadership powers, the decline in committee authority
(including reductions in committee staff size), and a drop in legislative
productivity. All of these factors have contributed to the decline in constitutional hearings. In particular, the decline in constitutional hearings is
largely explained by the interface of these factors with lawmaker incentives
to discount constitutional interpretation in favor of other pursuits: reelection, constituent service, and the advancement of favored policies.
First, congressional committees, with the notable exception of the Judiciary Committees, invest scarce staffing resources in developing policy
expertise, not constitutional expertise. After all, policy issues are a firstorder priority, and the Constitution and policy issues closely linked to the
Constitution are, at best, second-order priorities. Consequently, the 1995

Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but
Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307 (2002).
103
See infra notes 115–18118 and accompanying text.
104
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144 (1999).
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slashing of House committee staff by 40%105 may well have resulted in a
further discounting of constitutional issues in favor of core policy concerns.
Changes in how lawmakers run for office and interact with local constituents may also impact committee consideration of constitutional issues
with little salience. In particular, against the backdrop of declining committee influence in an ever more polarized Congress, lawmakers take time that
they might have spent on committee service and instead spend it on fundraising, constituent service, and other reelection efforts.106 Today’s lawmakers seek to strengthen their position with their constituents by
“visit[ing] their districts and states extremely frequently (often three or four
times a month). They and their staffs devote much of their time to constituency casework (with roughly one third of members’ staffs based in their
home district or state).”107 Fundraising demands have also increased, further drawing lawmakers away from committee business.108 For all these
reasons, lawmakers are more likely to view the pursuit of constitutional issues as a “form[] of political ‘indulgence.’”109
To make the above point more concrete, I think it useful to track
changes in lawmakers’ attitudes toward constitutional interpretation, especially the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court. Survey
data assembled by Bruce Peabody that compare lawmakers’ attitudes in
1959 and 1999 reveals a profound shift. In 1959, 40% of lawmakers
thought that courts should treat congressional interpretations of the Constitution as “controlling,” but in 1999, only 14% of lawmakers thought congressional judgments should be seen as controlling.110 Perhaps more
significantly, lawmakers in 1999 emphasized “local and electorally salient
matters” like gun control, Native American relations, and interactions between church and state as constitutional matters of “special legislative interest.”111 Peabody observed that the focus on local and constituent concerns
105

See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 72, at 110.
On the linkage between party polarization and the shift of lawmaker time away from committee
service and toward fundraising and other reelection efforts, see Eric Heberlig et al., The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of Congressional Parties, 68 J. POL. 992 (2006), which explains how political parties organize congressional institutions in order to facilitate fundraising.
Committee staff reductions also speak to declining committee influence and, with it, diminishing lawmaker interest in committee service. See supra notes 69–73. Correspondingly, lawmakers and their
staffs increasingly focus their energies on fundraising and constituent service. See supra notes 90–92.
107
ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO MUCH AND
GOVERN TOO LITTLE 49 (1997).
108
See id. at 70–72; see also Wendy K. Tam Cho & James G. Gimpel, Prospecting for (Campaign)
Gold, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 255, 255–56 (2007) (illustrating how fundraising demands detract from the
time available for normal policy business).
109
See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 163 (2004).
110
Id. at 147 tbl.3. For Peabody’s discussion of 1959–1999 differences, see id. at 156–58.
111
Id. at 151. In sharp contrast, in 1999 lawmakers did not rank foreign affairs or the separation of
powers as being of “special interest.” Id.
106
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“reflect[s] the more hectic pace of contemporary political life, filled with
the proliferating, immediate, and often reelection-oriented demands that can
crowd out other responsibilities, including constitutional interpretation.”112
More to the point, absent constituent or national party interest in constitutional questions,113 committee chairs are somewhat less likely to pursue
constitutional issues today than before. Along these lines, it is to be expected that the Judiciary Committees will occupy a larger and larger share
of constitutional hearings—lawmakers on the Judiciary Committees are
more likely to get signals from interest groups and others interested in constitutional issues than are lawmakers on other congressional committees.114
Peabody’s survey data are relevant for another reason. They highlight
lawmakers’ growing acquiescence to the Supreme Court’s authority to invalidate legislation: more than 70% of respondents said the Court should give
little or no weight to congressional judgments.115 Peabody’s data also signal
that today’s lawmakers are especially likely to engage in “position taking”
strategies.116 Position taking is taking actions without policy consequences
to make “judgmental statements” that match constituent sentiments.117
When reaching out to constituents this way, lawmakers are not particularly
interested in whether a court upholds or invalidates their handiwork; their
goal, instead, is to strengthen ties with constituents by saying “pleasing
things.”118
112

Id.
In 1959, Supreme Court rulings on communists and school desegregation were central both to
the national policy agenda and to voters, especially Southern voters. For additional discussion, see Neal
Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1342–46 (2006). For general treatments on Court–Congress relations in 1959, see DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966), and WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE
COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962).
114
See infra Part III.
115
Peabody, supra note 109, at 147.
116
See id. at 157.
117
Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive,
51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512–13 (2007) (quoting MAYHEW, supra note 85, at 74).
118
Id. For this very reason, I do not think that lawmakers are increasingly deferential to the courts
because of changed attitudes about judicial supremacy. In part, party polarization has fueled lawmaker
efforts to pursue jurisdiction-stripping proposals. See infra notes 193–94194 (detailing recent jurisdiction-stripping efforts and linking those efforts to polarization). Moreover, there is no reason to think that
there has been a pendulum shift toward judicial supremacy among the American people. Although there
is evidence of a slight upward tick of public support for the Court, the degree of difference is slight, and
consequently, fundamental changes in congressional committee practices cannot be attributed to changing attitudes toward judicial supremacy. See James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S.
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 543
(2003) (noting survey results). Finally, the trajectory of popular press coverage of the Supreme Court
has not shifted—journalists today are no more likely to embrace judicial supremacy than, say, journalists
in 1987, when Attorney General Meese ignited a firestorm of criticism by suggesting that Supreme
Court decisions were subject to political challenge. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3, 26–28 (2004) (detailing the academic and journalistic response to
Meese).
113
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Position taking is especially common in today’s politically polarized
Congress. Democrats and Republicans agree more within the party and less
with the other party so that lawmakers are more willing to back partydefined messages.119 Correspondingly, voters that identify themselves as
Democratic or Republican are more ideological today than ever before120 so
that increasingly partisan lawmakers can seek out electoral advantage by
taking those same partisan positions that they and their respective political
parties support.121
Position taking is also fueled by the fact that there is typically a negative correlation between party polarization and legislative productivity.122
In the Senate, ideological cohesion among minority party members has resulted in a noticeable decline in major legislation.123 The prevalence of divided government in the politically polarized 1990–2009 period also
contributed to a decline in legislative productivity. In particular, when each
party disagrees with and seeks to distance itself from the other party, the
President and Congress cannot come together to advance a mutually agree-

119

See Evans, supra note 56, at 219–27. For more on why party leaders are especially interested in
differentiating themselves this way, see supra note 59, which explains how changes in federal regulation
and technology create incentives for political parties to embrace one or another ideological message that
will resonate with polarized subsets of the population and not the more moderate median voter.
120
See Paul DiMaggio et al., Have Americans’ Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?, 102 AM.
J. SOC. 690, 734–38 (1996) (arguing that attitudes of Americans who identify with one or the other political party have become more polarized); Gary C. Jacobson, Party Polarization in National Politics: The
Electoral Connection, in POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA, 9,
17–18 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 2000) (showing that voter views on “hot button” issues
increasingly correlate with party identity).
121
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 98, at 135–36; Whittington, supra note 117, at 512–15.
122
See Lawrence C. Dodd & Scott Schraufnagel, Reconsidering Party Polarization and Policy
Productivity: A Curvilinear Perspective, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 8, at 393, 401–04.
Because of supermajority rules in the Senate, Congress–White House deadlock often persists during periods of unified government. During the 108th and 109th Congresses, when Republicans controlled both
the White House and Congress (i.e. from 2003 to 2007), 130 motions for cloture were filed, 62 in the
108th and 68 in the 109th. See Senate Action on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited June 3, 2011). During the 110th
Congress, under Democratic control, 139 motions for cloture were filed. See id. Likewise, in the 111th
Congress 136 motions were filed. See id. The fact that Democrats had 60 seats during much of this
time did not matter. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. Following the 2010 elections, after
which Republicans held 47 Senate seats and gained control of the House, there is good reason to think
that this pattern of polarized legislative statement will continue. See supra note 84.
123
See supra notes 83–84, 122 and accompanying text; see also Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395 (2009) (contrasting Watergate era to modern era to show
that a less polarized Congress can enact major legislation that limits presidential prerogatives); Smith &
Gamm, supra note 50, at 161 (discussing the links between partisanship and obstructionism); Barbara
Sinclair, Partisan Polarization, Rules and Legislative Productivity 20–22 (Sept. 2009) (paper prepared
for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1450627 (discussing the links between partisanship and decreased legislative productivity).
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able legislative agenda.124 With fewer opportunities to take credit for legislative accomplishments, lawmakers have stronger incentives to find ways to
stake out policy preferences. More than that, with voters and other constituents interested in policy positions and not constitutional reasoning, position-taking lawmakers are much more interested in using legislative
hearings as vehicles to articulate policy preferences than in considering potential constitutional objections to proposed legislation.125
There is one other reason why today’s hearings outside of the Judiciary
Committees are more likely to emphasize policy positions and less likely to
consider constitutional questions: the increasing unwillingness of the majority party to allow opposition lawmakers to challenge the constitutionality of
legislative proposals. Although it has always been the case that legislative
majorities have controlled the policy and hearing agendas of committee
hearings, party polarization has nevertheless resulted in further limits on
minority access to hearings.126 In part, the majority party’s increasing homogeneity has resulted in an absence of competing views that has made
hearings more one-sided. Committee chairs can count on party loyalists to
stick together, and consequently, there is less reason to reach out to majority or minority party members that do not necessarily agree with the chair’s
agenda. When Republicans controlled Congress from 1995 until 2007, for
example, Democratic lawmakers held “shadow” or “mock” hearings to pro124

For thirteen of the twenty years between 1990 and 2009, one or the other house of Congress had
a majority from a different party than the president. See Dennis Florig, Party Control of Congress and
the Presidency, DFLORIG.COM, http://www.dflorig.com/partycontrol.htm (last visited June 3, 2011); see
also Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 63
(2007) (attributing prevalence of divided government to rise in unilateral presidential policymaking).
125
See Mikva, supra note 88, at 609. In making these points, I do not mean to suggest that lawmakers and their constituents always care more about position taking than about potential constitutional
roadblocks to the enactment of favored policies. When Congress enacts “son of” legislation that responds to a Supreme Court invalidation of a federal statute, lawmakers often hold hearings to find ways
to work within constitutional boundaries set by the Court. See PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 57–61; Devins, supra note 102, at 1313–14. Furthermore, congressional action sometimes takes place in the shadow of some Supreme Court decision, forcing lawmakers and interest groups to think of the
constitutional implications of their decisions. Here are two examples: When Congress enacted the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, lawmakers and their constituents could not ignore the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of a state partial birth ban, but they could ignore the Court’s Commerce Clause rulings that arguably cast doubt on the constitutionality of the partial birth measure. See Neal Devins, How
Congress Paved the Way for the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revival: Lessons from the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 461 (2007). The Rehnquist Court’s limits
on group-conscious remedial legislation also figured into congressional hearings on the 2006 Voting
Rights Act reauthorization. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights
Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174 (2007).
126
See generally Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of Legislative Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006) (assessing constitutionality of Congress’s recent practice of excluding
minority party members from the legislative process). Before party polarization set in, committee chairs
would sometimes reach out to the minority in both agenda control and witness selection. See Christine
DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hearings, 45 W. POL. Q. 971, 976–80
(1992).
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test their inability to call witnesses or otherwise define the hearing agenda.127 Furthermore, with party leaders exercising greater control over the
agenda and membership of committees,128 committee chairs have less interest in and less freedom to pursue issues that do not match the interest of
party leaders. Against this backdrop, policy and constitutional objections to
committee initiatives will likely only come from the minority party, and the
majority party will not allow committee hearings to serve as a vehicle for
the airing of minority party objections.129
127

See, e.g., Democrats, White House Step Up Rhetoric on Spying Program, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at 3A; Steven T. Dennis & Liriel Higa, GOP Leaders Drop Drilling Provisions,
CQ TODAY, Nov. 10, 2005, at 1; Brian Hansen, Democrats Denounce EPA Mercury Rule, Call On Bush
Administration to Revise It, INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 25, 2005, at 5; James Pinkerton, Moving from ‘Me’ to
‘We’ on Health, CINCINNATI POST, June 23, 2007, at 14A; Dick Polman, Most Democrats Keep Quiet—
Lawmakers Who Backed War Unable to Use British Memos to Attack Bush, AKRON BEACON J., June 19,
2005, at A13.
128
See supra notes 62–84 and accompanying text.
129
The recent political struggle over national health care reform serves as an illustration. Between
President Obama’s inauguration and the enactment of H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, approximately forty-four congressional committee hearings were held primarily to review various aspects of national health care reform. However, none of these hearings focused on the constitutionality of national health care reform as a major topic of discussion. Moreover, only a single witness
during these hearings discussed the constitutionality of health care reform legislation at length. See Between You and Your Doctor: The Bureaucracy of Private Health Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2009), video
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkIv9nt_F2g (testimony of Michael F. Cannon, Director
of Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute) (positing that the U.S. Constitution’s General Welfare Clause
should not be expansively interpreted to incorporate national health care reform). Therefore, the Democratic-controlled 111th Congress chose not to perform in-depth hearings on the possible constitutional
problems involved with national health care reform.
With congressional committee hearings essentially closed off to debate regarding the constitutionality of national health care reform, Republicans turned to the floors of the U.S. House and Senate to voice
their objections. During the same time frame, eighty-eight pages of congressional floor debates discussed the constitutional questions surrounding national health care reform. All objections to the constitutionality of national health care reform were raised by Republicans during these debates. See, e.g.,
156 CONG. REC. H177–83 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2010) (statements of Reps. Garrett, Foxx, Broun, Gohmert,
and Bishop); 155 CONG. REC. S13,821–29 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statements of Sens. Hutchinson,
Ensign, Hatch, and Kyl); 155 CONG. REC. H12,429 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Rep. Poe).
After Republicans took over the House of Representatives in 2011, it seemed likely that Republican
leadership would convene hearings to challenge the underlying constitutionality of health care reform.
During the 2010 election campaign, Republican leadership questioned the constitutionality of health
care reform and embraced a proposal to require every bill to include language citing its constitutional
authority. See Jake Sherman & Richard E. Cohen, Republicans to Release ‘Contract with America’Style Election Agenda, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0910/42302.html. At that time, House Minority Leader John Boehner blogged that “[t]he centerpiece of
ObamaCare is a constitutionally suspect ‘individual mandate’” and that a requirement that all bills cite
specific constitutional authority could create a valuable “obstacle to expanded government.” See House
Republicans Want All Bills to Cite Constitutional Authority, FOX NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/17/house-republicans-want-bills-cite-constitutional-authority.
House
Minority Whip Eric Cantor embraced the requirement for similar reasons. See id. Following the 2010
elections, Republican leadership made clear that it intended to pursue its campaign to dismantle health
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Outside of the Judiciary Committees, today’s polarized Congress holds
fewer constitutional hearings than earlier, less polarized Congresses. I have
suggested a range of factors that directly or indirectly contribute to the
supply of constitutional hearings. Party polarization impacts all of these
factors and leads to declining committee interest in constitutional questions.
And although there is room to question the salience of any of these factors,
there is nevertheless good reason to attribute the overall decline in constitutional hearings to what may be the most consequential and pervasive
change in Congress over the past forty years.130
D. Interest Groups, Party Leaders, and the Variable Demand for
Constitutional Hearings
Congressional committee interest in constitutional questions ebbs and
flows.131 Numerous committees hold constitutional hearings in spike years
like 1977, 1987, and 1995 in the House or 1973, 1977, and 1981 in the Senate. At other times, especially since 1990, very few constitutional hearings are held, and those that are held are overwhelmingly held in the
Judiciary Committees. Two causes help explain the often dramatic year-toyear differences in constitutional hearings. First, outside of the Judiciary
Committees, there is no constituency in Congress that pushes to hold constitutional hearings. Congress and its constituents are interested in policy
goals and therefore view the Constitution in purely instrumental terms.132
Congressional committees, in other words, do not interpret the Constitution
as a matter of course—their interest in the Constitution is contingent on the
specific policy goals they seek to achieve. Second, the exogenous triggers
that affect the number and percentage of constitutional hearings also vary
from year to year. These factors include Supreme Court decisions, presidential actions, changes in party leadership, and the national policy agenda.

care reform. See Noam Levy, Republicans Are Spoiling for a Health Care Fight, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2010, at A1. For additional discussion, see infra notes 208–14 and accompanying text.
130
One other factor, suggested to me by Mitch Pickerill, is that congressional committee hearings
are impacted by the increasing volume of legislation that needs to be reauthorized and, more generally,
by the growth of the administrative state. Specifically, if committee business is increasingly defined by
the need to reauthorize and oversee federal programs, committees will simply have less time to pursue
the types of issues that are likely to implicate the Constitution. Pickerill’s suggestion is indirectly supported by studies on committee jurisdiction. One prominent study, for example, shows that Congress
must deal with more and more issues so that the jurisdiction of individual committees becomes denser.
See Frank R. Baumgartner et al., The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions, 62 J. POL. 321 (2000). With
more issues on their respective plates, it is understandable that committees would push aside secondorder concerns.
131
See supra Figures 1 & 2.
132
For the Judiciary Committees, of course, relevant interest group constituents care intensely about
policy issues that are inextricably constitutional issues, such as abortion and gun rights. For additional
discussion, see infra Part III.
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1. National Policy Agenda.—The message priorities of congressional
leaders and, more generally, the national policy agenda define the subjects
of congressional hearings. For the most part, constitutional issues play a
subordinate role in the overall national policy agenda, and even in that subordinate role, each party emphasizes different issues. Democrats emphasize
that they are the party of civil rights and civil liberties.133 Republicans, especially House Republicans, send a message that resonates with social conservatives. Recent Republican-led efforts to countermand court decisions
on same-sex marriage, abortion, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the Ten
Commandments exemplify this practice.134
With the exception of the period from 1963 to 1972, when social issues
dominated the public agenda, the national policy agenda has been largely
defined by economic issues.135 Topics such as separation of powers, federalism, and civil rights are not listed among the fourteen top policy issues
on the congressional agenda.136 For this reason, the overall percentage of
hearings on constitutional issues ranges from about 1% to 5% in each
chamber.137 Correspondingly, the number and percentage of constitutional
hearings appears especially variable because fairly small changes in the
message priorities of the majority parties can cause fairly significant
133

During the Alito confirmation hearing, for example, Democratic senators spoke at length about
abortion, voting rights, the use of torture in fighting the War on Terror, and federalism-based limits on
Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation. Adam Nagourney, Partisan Tenor of Alito
Hearing Reflects a Quick Change in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A17. Likewise, Democratic senators emphasized abortion and civil rights in the Roberts confirmation hearing. Robin Toner &
David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberals and Conservatives Remain Worlds Apart on Roberts’s Suitability, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A22.
134
See Devins, supra note 113, at 1354–58; Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT
(June 19, 2005), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=disorder_in_the_court. Republicans have also
championed numerous structural reforms—most notably, the 1994 Contract with America included provisions on term limits, the line-item veto, and unfunded mandates. See Whittington, Devins & Hicken,
supra note 2, at 402.
135
See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 144–48 (1993).
136
See id. at 254; see also Policy Agendas Project, COLL. OF LIBERAL ARTS, UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN, http://www.policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis (last visited June 3, 2011). Furthermore,
when pursuing first-order economic or social reform, majority party lawmakers may ignore the constitutional implications of their handiwork. For example, as discussed supra note 129, Democratic lawmakers largely ignored potential constitutional objections, like federalism concerns, to the recently enacted
health care legislation, preferring, instead, to focus on the policy aspects of the bill. Moreover, party
polarization reinforces the dominion of economic, not social, issues on the national policy agenda. For
reasons identified supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text, party leaders seek roll call votes on economic issues that are likely to expose divisions between the two parties. In this way, party polarization
is a vicious cycle. Party leaders have more power in a polarized Congress and have incentive to pursue
roll call votes on issues that strengthen party polarization. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text
(explaining how party leaders have greater power when there is an ideological divide between the parties). Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the national agenda gravitates toward economic matters
that divide the parties.
137
See supra Figure 2.
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changes in the relative number and percentage of constitutional hearings.138
More significant, because few constituencies outside of the Judiciary
Committees push Congress to regularly consider constitutional questions,
congressional interest in constitutional hearings is likely to be triggered by
court decisions, presidential initiatives, and changes in party leadership.139
2. Court Decisions.—Court decisions, especially Supreme Court decisions, seem an obvious trigger for constitutional hearings. Following Supreme Court invalidations of federal statutes, lawmakers and interest groups
that back the statute often pursue one or another statutory alternative that
will advance their agenda while taking into account the legal infirmities
identified by the Supreme Court. From 1954 to 1997, Congress sought to
save its underlying statutory policy in 36 of the 74 cases in which the Supreme Court struck down federal legislation.140 At the same time, lawmaker
responses to Court rulings slowed markedly after 1986. From 1986 to
1998, lawmakers only responded to 4 of 18 Rehnquist Court invalidations
of federal statutes.141 More striking, even though the Rehnquist Court invalidated all or parts of 31 laws between 1995 and 2002, “[t]hese rulings had
138

Because Congress holds a fairly small number of constitutional hearings, a spike may also be the
byproduct of the convergence of several unrelated constitutional issues being considered at the same
time. In other words, there may be a spike in constitutional hearings that is not tied to an obvious trigger
(change in policy agenda or leadership, a controversial court ruling, etc.). In 1977, for example, the
House and Senate each held an above-average number of constitutional hearings. See supra Figure 1.
This spike had nothing to do with the shift from divided government under President Ford, a Republican, to unified government under President Carter, a Democrat. Instead, the spike reflected the confluence of several general agenda items being considered at the same time. Constitutional issues discussed
in 1977 included D.C. statehood, the decriminalization of marijuana, and civil rights for institutionalized
persons. See, e.g., Representation for the District of Columbia: Hearing on H.J. Res. 139, 142, 392,
554, and 565 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. (1977); Decriminalization of Marihuana: Hearing on H.R. 432 Before the H. Select Comm.
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 95th Cong. (1977); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearing
on S. 1393 and H.R. 2439 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. (1977). For a complete listing of 1977 hearings, visit PROQUEST CONGRESSIONAL,
https://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp, search “constitution!” in subject term for the date range January
1, 1977, through December 31, 1977, and examine archive entries.
139
In discussing these triggers, I call attention to various instances where today’s polarized Congress was presented with opportunities to tackle one constitutional issue or another. This discussion
makes clear that there were numerous opportunities for Congress to play an active role in interpreting
the Constitution—ranging from responses to the Rehnquist Court’s invalidation of federal statutes to
unilateral presidential warmaking. See infra notes 144–70170 and accompanying text; see also Michael
J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525, 530–31 (2009) (providing past examples of Court
decisions, changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, and presidential initiatives that triggered
constitutional activity in Congress).
140
PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 42–43. And although Congress may not have held constitutional
hearings each time it responded to a judicial invalidation, I would think that several, if not most, of these
statutory invalidations triggered a hearing—both to provide interest groups with an opportunity to testify
and to inform committee members and staff of the best way to navigate around an unfavorable Court
ruling.
141
Id.
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little aggregate effect on congressional hearings at which constitutional issues were discussed.”142
Two factors help explain increasing lawmaker acquiescence to Supreme Court rulings invalidating federal statutes. First, today’s Congress is
more accepting of Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal statutes and
thus more likely to engage in position-taking behavior, in which lawmakers
care about registering party positions rather than whether the federal courts
will uphold legislation after the statute is enacted.143 Second, during the
Rehnquist Court’s tenure, lawmakers were not especially upset by (and may
have supported some) Supreme Court invalidations of federal statutes. The
Court’s federalism revival, for example, did not begin until Republicans
had gained control of Congress while running on an anti-Congress agenda,
so there was no meaningful ideological distance between the Court and the
sitting Congress on those issues.144 Equally important, unlike earlier abortion, school desegregation, and other civil rights decisions, Rehnquist Court
decisionmaking rarely foreclosed democratic outlets.145 In other words,
Rehnquist Court decisionmaking did not stop lawmakers from pursuing
first-order priorities.146
Absent something as stark as the Lochner era, when Court hostility to
the New Deal undermined first-order priorities, the constitutional agenda in
today’s polarized Congress appears to be set by Congress rather than by
judicial decisionmaking.147 It did not matter that the Rehnquist Court invalidated more federal statutes than any Court before it and in so doing revived federalism as a limit on congressional power. No interest group tied
to the Republican Party demanded constitutional hearings on these decisions. Moreover, majority lawmakers are not interested in abstract threats
142

Whittington, supra note 9, at 95. For slightly updated data, see Whittington, Devins & Hicken,
supra note 2, at 408.
143
See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
144
See Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123 (2003). In
sharp contrast, Democratic lawmakers claimed that the Court engaged in “conservative judicial activism”; if Democrats had controlled Congress, it seems likely that they would have held constitutional
hearings to make their case against the Court. See Devins, supra note 102, at 1325–35 (describing and
analyzing Democratic claims).
145
See PICKERILL, supra note 89, at 148–49; Devins, supra note 102, at 1318–23.
146
See Whittington, supra note 117, at 511–16. In sharp contrast, Warren Court decisionmaking
threatened lawmaker preferences in a more fundamental way. Perhaps for this reason, 40% of lawmakers in 1959 thought that the Supreme Court should treat congressional constitutional interpretations as
controlling, a stark contrast to the mere 14% of congressmen in 1999 who thought this. See Peabody,
supra note 109, at 147 (contrasting 1959 and 1999 survey data).
147
To make this point more concrete, let me highlight a counterexample of today’s Congress holding constitutional hearings in order to comply with Supreme Court dictates. When reauthorizing the
Voting Rights Act in 2006, lawmakers took into account Rehnquist Court decisions governing Congress’s authority to enact remedial race-conscious legislation. See Persily, supra note 125, at 252–53.
Were the Supreme Court to place comparable constraints on other exercises of congressional power,
Congress might be compelled to hold constitutional hearings on a broad range of issues or, alternatively,
to hold constitutional hearings as part of a broader effort to force the Court to change its doctrine.
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to congressional power as long as the majority party can pursue its legislative agenda.148 With increased emphasis on message politics and position
taking, lawmakers are thus less invested in the constitutional fate of their
handiwork.
Yet judicial decisions that trigger constitutional hearings are very much
tied to the message agenda of the majority party. Consider, for example,
recent Republican-led efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction on a
range of hot-button social issues, including same-sex marriage, the Pledge
of Allegiance, and the public display of the Ten Commandments.149 None
of these decisions questioned federal power, and none was issued by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, Republican lawmakers sought to strengthen
ties with social conservatives by expressing disapproval of these decisions
and providing an outlet for party constituents to testify at hearings.150 For
this very reason, the Supreme Court ruling that most vexed the Republican
Congress was Kelo v. City of New London, a property rights case that spoke
much more to the exercise of state than federal power.151
Court decisions may trigger constitutional hearings, but only if those
decisions undermine the policy priorities of the majority party or, alternatively, provide majority lawmakers with opportunities to make judgmental
statements that resonate with their party and their constituents.152 Conse148

See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131 (2004).
See generally Devins, supra note 113 (explaining why Republican attacks on the judiciary in
2006 and 2007 did not threaten judicial independence).
150
For an instructive though one-sided treatment of the politics of Republican attacks on the courts,
see Rosenfeld, supra note 134.
151
545 U.S. 469 (2005). Kelo-related hearings include H.R. 3405, Strengthening the Ownership of
Private Property Act of 2005 (STOPP): Hearing on H.R. 3405 Before the H. Comm. on Res., 109th
Cong. (2005); Protecting Property Rights After Kelo: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005); Supreme Court’s Kelo Decision and Potential Congressional Responses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005); Kelo v. City of New London U.S. Supreme Court Decision and Strengthening the
Ownership of Private Property Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3405 Before the H. Comm. on Agric.,
109th Cong. (2005); and Eminent Domain: Are Ohio Homeowners at Risk?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005).
152
After the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a major section of 2002 campaign finance
reform law in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), Democratic Party politicians immediately
expressed their disapproval with the case’s outcome. See Russ Feingold, High Court Opens the Floodgates, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2010, at 9A; Daniel Malloy & Bill Toland, Court Lets Corporations Dip
into Politics, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1; Jared Polis, Politics and Corporate
Personhood, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 2010, at B11; David G. Savage, Campaign Cash Limits Lifted,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2010, at C12. And through congressional hearings, Democratic Party committee
chairs were able to bring forth multiple witnesses whose testimony critiqued the Court’s decision and
advocated new campaign finance reform legislation. With the exception of Ted Olson, the lawyer who
argued Citizens United, no witness defended the decision, and no witness claimed that the decision
could only be overturned through a constitutional amendment. See H.R. 5175, The Disclose Act, Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
149
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quently, there is no necessary correlation between Congress’s holding constitutional hearings and Supreme Court constitutional decisionmaking.153
With Democrats now in charge of Congress, the ideological distance between the Court and the Congress has grown, raising the prospect of Court
decisions frustrating the policy preferences of today’s lawmakers and their
constituents. I discuss this issue in the conclusion of this Article.
3. Presidential Action.—The national policy agenda that drives constitutional hearings is often shaped by presidential actions. Congress, for
example, held an unusual number of constitutional hearings in connection
with the Nixon Administration both because of the President’s strong push
for unilateral authority and because of Watergate.154 Also, when President
Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, the Senate held several constitutional hearings.155 At the same time, the changing balance of
power between Congress and the President may have contributed to the
overall decline of constitutional hearings. Unlike the Watergate era, when
Democrats and Republicans were willing to come together to stand up for
congressional power, today’s Congress has ceded significant policymaking
authority to the President.156 Consider, for example, the drop in constitutional hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs
Committees. This drop corresponds with increasing presidential control
H. Admin., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Theodore B. Olson); see also We the People? Corporate
Spending in American Elections After Citizens United: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2010); First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform After Citizens United: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Corporate America vs. the Voter: Examining the Supreme Court’s Decision
to Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in Elections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 111th Cong. (2010).
153
This applies both to Court invalidations of federal statutes and consequential Supreme Court decisions (measured by front-page New York Times coverage).
154
Whittington, Devins & Hicken, supra note 2, at 397.
155
See supra note 23.
156
See Devins, supra note 123, at 406–15 (linking party polarization to the growth of presidential
power); see also Moe & Howell, supra note 104, at 143–48 (explaining why lawmakers have little interest in preserving, let alone expanding, Congress’s institutional prerogatives). On questions of constitutional interpretation, especially on the separation of powers, the gap between presidential incentives to
advance a coherent pro-president agenda and congressional incentives to advance a pro-Congress agenda are striking. See Moe & Howell, supra note 104, at 136–38. Presidents, for example, typically back
the efforts of the Department of Justice to coordinate legal policymaking, a department whose Offices of
Legal Counsel and Solicitor General have strong incentives to ensure uniformity in the legal positions of
the Executive Branch. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the
White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219–20 (1998). For
its part, Congress has no incentive to break up this Department of Justice monopoly on legal policymaking. See id. at 206–07. Instead, in an era of declining congressional interest in abstract questions of
constitutional law, lawmakers play a limited, largely reactive role to presidential constitutional interpretations. In particular, in periods of divided government, majority party lawmakers sometimes use hearings to question the constitutionality of presidential initiatives. See supra note 40. In other words,
although lawmakers have not ceded the power of constitutional interpretation to the Justice Department,
lawmakers lack the incentive to systematically advance their own theory of constitutional interpretation.
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over warmaking.157 More generally, since presidential unilateralism has become more prevalent,158 it is now unlikely that today’s lawmakers will be
interested in holding constitutional hearings and otherwise pursuing structural reforms that shift the balance of power back to Congress.159 Lawmakers are interested in serving local constituencies, not standing up for
abstract notions of congressional power.160 In other words, presidential initiatives may trigger constitutional hearings, but only if they implicate the
party priorities of the majority party or its constituents.
4. Changes in Party Leadership.—Changes in party leadership, especially after the new majority party had been the minority party for a number
of years, are defining moments in Congress. “Members of the new majority
party are likely to seek to revise a large number of [old majority party] policies . . . [and] are more likely to delegate agenda powers to party lead-

157

See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 261 (rev. 2d ed. 2004). Perhaps for this reason,
today’s lawmakers are far less interested in serving on the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees. See Linda L. Fowler & R. Brian Law, Seen but Not Heard: Committee Visibility and Institutional Change in the Senate National Security Committees, 1947–2006, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357, 381
(2008).
158
See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 112–20 (2003) (discussing the rise of unilateral presidential policymaking); see
also Devins, supra note 123, at 406–15 (explaining why today’s lawmakers lack the will or way to
check presidential unilateralism).
159
See Devins, supra note 123, at 413–15; Moe & Howell, supra note 104, at 144–45. Even when
a change in party leadership results in divided government, lawmakers use hearings to strengthen their
party’s message, not the broader powers of Congress. In particular, party leaders are unwilling to trade
off the immediate needs of their party in favor of institutional reforms that are unlikely to be enacted because of delaying techniques and that may cut against their party’s interests if the opposition party were
to regain control of Congress. Consider, for example, the 1995 Republican takeover and the 2007 Democratic takeover. In 1995, Republicans sought to diminish legislative power by pursuing Contract with
America reforms that shifted power to the states. In 2007, Democrats sought to embarrass the Bush
Administration through oversight hearings that did not seek to shift power away from the President to
the Congress. See supra note 40; infra note 160.
160
See supra note 104 and accompanying text. In today’s polarized Congress, one would think that
constitutional hearings might increase when the government was divided—so that the majority in Congress could use hearings to challenge the constitutionality of presidential actions. Yet overall patterns of
constitutional hearings suggest no meaningful differences between unified and divided government. See
supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. For example, the 1995 spike in House constitutional hearings seems tied to the Republican pursuit of Contract with America reforms, not the shift to divided
government. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. Also, the 2007 Democratic takeover of
Congress did not spur on an increase in constitutional hearings. See supra Figure 1. Thus, even though
Congress does hold noticeably more oversight hearings when the government is divided, it appears that
constitutional questions are not regularly pursued in these hearings. See Somin & Devins, supra note
40, at 986–87 (noting patterns in lawmaker oversight during periods of unified and divided government).
Of course, that is not to say that majority party lawmakers never use oversight hearings to cast doubt on
the constitutionality of presidential initiatives during periods of divided government. After the Democratic takeover of Congress in 2007, for example, lawmakers planned to step up their oversight of President Bush’s enemy combatant initiatives. See Seth Stern, The House Committees: Judiciary, 64 CQ
WKLY. 3001, 3001 (2006).
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ers . . . .”161 In 1995, when Republicans took over the House after forty
years of Democratic control, power was centralized in House leadership,
and lawmakers pursued a range of significant legislative reforms.162 Federalism and other constitutional issues figured prominently in the Republican
policy agenda, and consequently, there was a huge spike in the number of
House constitutional hearings held in the immediate wake of the 1995 takeover.163 Likewise, in 1981, when Republicans took over the Senate after
twenty-six years of Democratic control, the Reagan Revolution figured
prominently in the spike in constitutional hearings: the Senate held hearings
on firearms, tort claims, tuition tax credits, busing, affirmative action, and
abortion.164
Changes in party leadership, however, do not necessarily mean that
there will be a spike in constitutional hearings. In 2007, when Democrats
regained control of Congress after twelve years of Republican control in the
House and six years in the Senate, both the number and percentage of constitutional hearings declined.165 Unlike its 1981 and 1995 Republican counterparts, the 2007 Democratic policy agenda did not prominently feature
constitutional issues.166 In the conclusion of this Article, I discuss whether
this downturn signals either growing disinterest in constitutional hearings,
differences between the Democratic Party and Republican Party agendas, or
some combination of both.
161

David W. Rohde et al., Dynamic Congressional Organization: A Theory of Institutional Stability
and Reform 13 (Mar. 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Sixty-Seventh Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with the Northwestern University
Law Review).
162
See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
163
See Whittington, supra note 9, at 93–95.
164
See Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion: Hearing on S.J. Res. 17, S.J. Res. 18, S.J.
Res. 19, and S.J. Res. 110 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. (1981); Firearms Owner Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1030 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on
Agency Admin. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Court-Ordered School Busing:
Hearings on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Affirmative Action and Equal Protection: Hearings on S.J. Res. 41 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); Tuition Tax Credits: Hearings on S. 550 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin., 97th Cong. (1981).
165
See supra Figures 1 & 3. In the 2010 campaign, which resulted in a Republican majority in the
House, Republicans ran on an agenda that sought to limit the scope of federal governmental programs,
most notably health care. See supra note 129; see infra notes 208–14214. And although House Republicans might hold hearings on the constitutional foundations of health care reform and other governmental programs, there is reason to think that constitutional issues will not play a prominent role in the
House Republican agenda. See infra notes 208–14214 and accompanying text.
166
Democrats did centralize power in newly elected House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. See Aldrich &
Rohde, supra note 8, at 234–37; Rohde et al., supra note 161, at 28–31. Pelosi, moreover, sidestepped
the committee system when she exercised power, bypassing committees altogether to force votes on six
bills that party leadership had identified as priority items. See Rohde et al., supra note 161, at 29.
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*

*

*

Outside of the Judiciary Committees, there has been a decline in congressional committee consideration of constitutional issues. This Part has
attributed that decline to party polarization. Also, by discussing reasons
why the demand for congressional hearings is variable over time, this Part
has suggested that there will be occasional spikes in constitutional hearings
and identified a range of factors that contribute to these spikes. I do not
doubt that some of the factors I identified are not very predictive or that I
may have omitted some relevant factors. Nonetheless, there has been a decline in overall committee interest in constitutional questions revealed by
the general decline in constitutional hearings, and more noticeably, there are
dramatic differences in the relative percentage of constitutional hearings
held by the Judiciary Committee and other constitutional committees. For
reasons detailed in this Part, party polarization can explain the general decline in committee interest in constitutional questions. In Part III of this Article, I discuss why the Judiciary Committees have bucked this trend and, in
so doing, reinforce this Part’s conclusions about party polarization’s likely
impact on the number and location of constitutional hearings.
III. PARTY POLARIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
Like all congressional committees, the Judiciary Committees are very
much influenced by party polarization. Before 1985, for example, the Judiciary Committees invited nonpartisan academic witnesses to testify at constitutional hearings, but over the past two decades, the Judiciary
Committees almost always call on witnesses who can be relied on to support the policy preferences of one or the other party.167 Party polarization
also affects the issues that the Judiciary Committees pursue, especially the
House Judiciary Committee because so much Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing time is dedicated to judicial confirmations.168 From 2003 to 2005,
the House Judiciary Committee reinforced ties with social conservatives by
holding hearings and casting votes on proposals to strip the federal courts of

167

For a general treatment of how party polarization impacted witness lists and other aspects of
constitutional hearings, see Devins, supra note 7, at 1543–45, which compares pre- and post-1985 practices. By highlighting the increasing partisan nature of committee hearings, I do not mean to suggest
that academic witnesses either lack expertise or craft their testimony to match the stated preferences of
the political party that asks them to testify. My point, instead, is that committee staff members ensure
that the witnesses the committee calls will testify in ways that support the majority’s preferences.
168
Party polarization has also impacted the number of constitutional confirmation hearings held by
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In particular, polarization has resulted in the Senate Judiciary Committee spending more and more time on the confirmation hearings of federal appeals court judges. See infra
note 201 (detailing and examining the increase in the number of constitutional confirmation hearings in
the Senate Judiciary Committee). For additional discussion, see infra note 171.
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jurisdiction over school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and other controversial issues.169
Another measure of increasing party polarization is the rise in partyline voting. Unlike the 1970s, when committee members would often cross
party lines, the post-1995 period is full of examples of party-line voting.170
In the Senate, the practice of bipartisan support for Supreme Court nominees, typical from 1970 to 1987, has largely given way to party-line voting
in the past decade.171 In the House, in 1999, committee members reinforced
“public perception[s] of the intense partisanship” by casting party-line votes
on articles of impeachment against President Bill Clinton; in 1974, committee members “rose above partisanship” when voting on articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, reflecting the then-narrow
ideological gap between the parties.172
Judiciary Committee polarization is more extreme than party polarization elsewhere because the Judiciary Committees tend to attract especially
ideological lawmakers.173 Correspondingly, interest groups that have strong
ties to the Judiciary Committees are often identified with the far left or far
right.174 For these very reasons, party polarization has done anything but
diminish Judiciary Committee interest in the Constitution. Moreover, the
Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over civil liberties, constitutional
amendments, and federal courts, not to mention the Senate’s power to confirm federal judges and Justice Department officials.175 This confluence of
169

See Devins, supra note 113; Rosenfeld, supra note 134. For additional discussion, see infra note
200 and accompanying text.
170
See infra notes 171–172; see also Judiciary Committee Votes on Recent Supreme Court Nominees, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/SupremeCourt/
CommitteeVotes.cfm (last visited June 3, 2011) (recording committee votes on Supreme Court nominations dating back to 1971).
171
From 1970 until the 1987 confirmation hearing for Robert Bork, the Senate unanimously approved the nominations of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia; following the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, the committee has sharply divided along party lines. See Supreme Court
Nominations, Present–1798, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/
Nominations.htm (last visited June 3, 2011). Votes on Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Sotomayor were largely along party lines. See id.; see also Abramowitz, supra note 56, at 32–33 (noting
rise of party-line voting in the Senate); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics of Advice and
Consent: Putting Judges on the Federal Bench, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 8, at 241 (attributing changes in Senate judicial confirmation practices to, among other things, party polarization).
172
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 193 (2d ed. 2000). In the Clinton case, the House Judiciary Committee cast party-line votes. In the Nixon case, six Judiciary Committee Republicans joined Democrats in voting for
articles of impeachment. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 255 (2007). After the release of the Watergate tapes, all but
one Judiciary Committee Republican supported articles of impeachment. Id. at 256.
173
See infra notes 186–89189 and accompanying text.
174
See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
175
See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 451–52 (2009)
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jurisdiction, member preferences, and interest group pressures has caused
the Judiciary Committees to hold more than 70% of all constitutional hearings since 1995—in the less polarized 1970s, the Judiciary Committees held
less than 50% of constitutional hearings.176
A. Committee Members
Members of Congress choose committees based on their reelection
ambitions, policy concerns, and desires to achieve status within their chambers.177 The Judiciary Committees are quintessential policy committees,
and members who are on those committees predominantly have “issuebased motivations.”178 Because the Judiciary Committees offer little reelection value, members choose to serve on the Judiciary Committees because
of their personal interest in engaging with the legalistic issues considered by
the Committee.179 Those issues are plentiful (more bills and resolutions are
referred to the Judiciary committees than to any other committee in either
the House or Senate);180 they are highly salient (the bills feature more in national news coverage);181 and they are contested (concerned outsiders see
their interests as competing with one another).182
Judiciary Committee members are most often policy-oriented lawyers.183 They are comfortable with, even relish, legalistic arguments, often
employing a “lawyer-like culture and deliberative style.”184 Judiciary
Committee members are usually also strong partisans. Unlike the period
(House Rule X(1)(k)); U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 1101, at 34 (2008) (Senate Rule XXV(1)(m)).
176
See supra Figures 9–12. Although my analysis focuses on the reasons that the Judiciary Committees are especially likely to hold constitutional hearings, I also recognize that committee leaders
sometimes purposefully keep an issue off the committee’s docket. For example, throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, the House Judiciary Committee “became known as the graveyard for social conservative initiatives.” MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 136 (2009). At that time, Democratic leadership made sure
that committee members “would kill constitutional amendments and other measures desired by conservatives on such subjects as school prayer, abortion, budget procedures, and term limits.” Roger H. Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 107 (1993).
177
See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 60–62; FENNO, supra note 85, at 1.
178
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 72.
179
Lynette P. Perkins, Member Recruitment to a Mixed Goal Committee: The House Judiciary
Committee, 43 J. POL. 348, 353–56 (1981).
180
Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Congress, in JUDGES
AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90, 104 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); see also
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 88–91 (noting that the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committees is
highly fragmented).
181
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 91–93.
182
Id. at 93–96.
183
See MILLER, supra note 176, at 135 (“The House Judiciary Committee used to be known as the
‘Committee of Lawyers.’”).
184
Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-institutional Perspective, 45 W. POL. Q. 949, 961 (1992).
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from 1963 until 1972, when civil rights and social issues figured prominently in the national policy agenda and policy entrepreneurs were attracted to
the Judiciary Committees,185 the post-1980 Judiciary Committees have increasingly attracted “conservative Republicans and liberal Democratic firebrands.”186 In part, party leaders may see to it that “‘reliable’ partisans are
given seats on Judiciary.”187 More tellingly, because most lawmakers are
uninterested in staking out positions on divisive social issues,188 the Judiciary Committees often draw lawmakers from the extremes of their parties.189
Party polarization has shaped the membership as well as the agendas of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. In the House, Democratic interest in serving on the Judiciary Committee began to wane in the 1980s,
when members found themselves in a defensive posture, seeking to beat
back Reagan era initiatives,190 and the Judiciary Committee remained unpopular throughout the George W. Bush Administration.191 But ideological
Republicans, many of whom were not lawyers, sought out the House Judiciary Committee because of their interest in divisive social issues like abortion, separation of church and state, affirmative action, and gun control.192
The corresponding willingness of the House Judiciary Committee to hold
185

See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 73; Lynette P. Perkins, Influences of Members’ Goals
on Their Committee Behavior: The U.S. House Judiciary Committee, 5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 373, 377–83
(1980).
186
DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 16, at 219.
187
Davidson, supra note 180, at 105.
188
Perkins, supra note 179, at 349. For this very reason, many senators do not want to serve on the
Judiciary Committee. See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 82.
189
Correspondingly, the Judiciary Committees, unlike other committees, are more likely to put social issues at the front of their agendas even though the national policy agenda typically focuses on economic issues. See supra notes 135–36136 and accompanying text (discussing predominance of
economic issues in national policy agenda).
190
MILLER, supra note 176, at 136; see DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 73.
191
In an effort to recruit House Democrats to serve on the Judiciary Committee, for example, Democratic leadership granted waivers to committee members so that service on the Judiciary Committees
would not count against a committee member’s ability to serve on other committees. For an example of
this practice, see Press Release, Congressman Artur Davis, Congressman Artur Davis Newly Appointed
to House Administration Committee (May 3, 2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20090503110207/http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/al07_davis/houseadmin050307.html (accessed
by searching the Internet Archive index). Perhaps for this reason, Democrats serving on the House Judiciary Committee during the George W. Bush era are somewhat closer to the party median—especially
compared to far-right Republicans who served on the Committee with them. See Memorandum from
Nick Cumings to author (Nov. 15, 2009) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (detailing distance between party medians and Judiciary Committee members).
192
See SCOTT A. FRISCH & SEAN Q. KELLY, COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT POLITICS IN THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 107 (2006); MILLER, supra note 176, at 136–37. Not surprisingly, House
Republicans on the Judiciary Committee during George W. Bush’s Administration were at the far right
of their party. See Memorandum from Nick Cumings to author, supra note 191, at 2. For additional
discussion on the ties between Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee and social conservative
interest groups, see Devins, supra note 113, and Rosenfeld, supra note 134.
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hearings on and report out jurisdiction-stripping bills reflects increasing
party polarization because Republican Judiciary Committee members are
increasingly partisan and increasingly committed to the social conservative
agenda.193 It also reflects declining reverence for the federal courts because
committee members are now willing to use “the courts as pawns in a broader partisan and ideological culture war.”194
Party polarization has also affected the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Most significantly, polarization has transformed the process of confirming
lower federal court judges, resulting in a dramatic upswing in the amount of
time it takes for the Senate to confirm judges and an equally dramatic
downswing in the percentage of lower court nominees whom the Committee approves.195 Because most lawmakers now see constitutional interpreta193

See MILLER, supra note 176, at 95; Devins, supra note 113, at 1355 (tying jurisdiction-stripping
measures to social conservative goals); Rosenfeld, supra note 134 (connecting opposition to judicial activism and support for jurisdictional limits to the Christian Right and the Republican Party).
194
MILLER, supra note 176, at 147; see also id. at 142–52 (discussing how changes in the institutional culture of the House Judiciary Committee affect the Judicial Branch). Against this backdrop,
there is reason to question the Judiciary Committees’ reputation for caring about whether the Supreme
Court will uphold the Committees’ handiwork. Instead, it may be that party polarization has transformed committee attitudes toward the courts. For a discussion of earlier committee practices, see Mark
C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317
(1993). In this article, Miller details differences between the House Judiciary and the House Energy and
Commerce Committees in their respective handling of legislation that was likely to be challenged on
constitutional grounds—finding that the Energy and Commerce Committees were uninterested in potential constitutional challenges and that the Judiciary Committee was very much concerned about such
challenges. See id. at 327–36.
195
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 16, at 379–87; Binder & Maltzmann, supra note 171, at
242. Another measure of the increasing importance of federal court of appeals nominations to the work
of the Senate Judiciary Committee is the fact that, from 1970 to 1989, the first half of this study, the
Committee held 31 constitutionally related confirmation hearings on court of appeals nominees. From
1990 to 2009, though, the Committee held 61 such hearings. This number was calculated by using the
electronic version of the CIS index available through LexisNexis. For additional discussion of the
search methodology, see supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. William and Mary reference librarian Paul Hellyer and I searched the CIS index for “judiciary and senate” in the “congressional source”
field, “(court of appeals or circuit) and (nominat! or confirm!)” in the “all fields except full text” field,
and “ATLEAST10(constitution or constitutional)” in the “all fields including full text” field. False hits
were then excluded. With respect to other confirmation hearings held by Senate Judiciary, we conducted a similar search. We searched for “judiciary and senate” in the “congressional source” field,
“nominat! or confirm!” in the “all fields except full text” field, and “ATLEAST10(constitution or constitutional)” in the “all fields including full text” field. From this larger subset, we excluded false hits and
federal court of appeals nominations. The numbers were stable between the two periods—44 for the
1970–1989 period and 38 for the 1990–2009 period, further highlighting the dramatic changes in federal
court of appeals confirmation hearings, changes which can be attributed to increasing polarization between the parties. We also conducted another search, referenced supra note 16, looking at constitutional
confirmation hearings throughout the Senate and comparing the number of hearings in and outside the
Judiciary Committees. We did this by searching for “nominat! or confirm!” in the “all fields except full
text” field and “ATLEAST10(constitution or constitutional)” in the “all fields including full text” field.
After reviewing the results and excluding false hits and Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings, we identified the number of constitutional confirmation hearings outside of the Judiciary Committee. These numbers support the claim that today’s congressional committees, other than the Judiciary
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tion as the business of the federal courts, the increasing ideological gap between the parties has resulted in hard-fought conflicts over nominations to
the federal courts of appeal.196 Because of this, the Senate Judiciary Committee attracts members interested in engaging in high-stakes, highvisibility battles over divisive issues of constitutional interpretation.197
B. Interest Groups
The Judiciary Committees’ continuing interest in holding constitutional
hearings is also tied to the policy agendas of the Committees’ interest group
constituents. Unlike constituent committees, which are often beholden to a
narrow, unified set of interests,198 members of the Judiciary Committees
split sharply along ideological lines, taking positions on deeply contested
issues. Committee members, in other words, are identified with the positions taken by members of conflicting interest groups. Not surprisingly,
committee members work closely with these policy-oriented interest group
constituents. During the confirmation hearings for Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, for example, Democratic constituents pushed

Committee, are less engaged in constitutional questions. There were 72 constitutional confirmation
hearings outside of Judiciary in the period from 1970 to 1989 and 39 in the period from 1990 to 2009.
The number of confirmation hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee also increased from 75 in
the period from 1970 through 1989 to 99 in the period from 1990 through 2009.
Changes in Senate practices in confirming lower federal court judges, however, do not explain Senate Judiciary Committee preeminence in holding constitutional hearings. This preeminence is largely
attributable to the dramatic downswing in constitutional hearings by other congressional committees.
See supra Figures 1 & 2 (highlighting overall decline in number and percentage of constitutional hearings). Moreover, for reasons identified supra note 22, several appellate court confirmation hearings did
not show up in our data set, which suggests that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s dominance is not
linked to these confirmation hearings. Moreover, even though the number of appeals court constitutional hearings doubled in the second half of this study, the average number of those hearings per year is
fairly low: the number doubled from 1.5 per year to 3 per year.
196
See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 171, at 256–57 (noting that Democrats made scrutiny of
judicial nominees a caucus priority in 2003). During the George W. Bush Administration, Democrats on
the Senate Judiciary Committee saw judicial nominations as an ideological battle, and perhaps for this
reason, the median Democrat on the Committee moved further and further to the left during the George
W. Bush Administration. See Memorandum from Nick Cumings to author, supra note 191, at 1 (demonstrating this trend).
197
Ever since the hearings on Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, media coverage of Supreme Court confirmations has increased roughly 38%, making the Senate Judiciary Committee an especially attractive committee for members interested in reaching out to their constituents
through media coverage. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS 98 (2005). Yet given the divisive issues faced by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Committee typically attracts members who can safely stake out positions on these highly
charged issues.
198
See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 68, at 74–77, 84–86 (noting that the work of constituent
committees is inextricably linked to the interests of the districts and states that elect constituent committee members to Congress).
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for the Committee to hold constitutional hearings.199 Likewise, recent
House Republican efforts to consider jurisdiction-stripping legislation are
part of the Committee’s effort to reinforce its ties with social conservative
interests.200
It is little wonder, then, that the Judiciary Committees continue to hold
constitutional hearings. Not only do these committees have jurisdiction
over constitutional issues and judicial confirmations, Judiciary Committee
members are personally interested in these issues, as are the Committees’
interest group constituents. Moreover, because other congressional committees are letting the courts sort out the constitutionality of their handiwork, judicial confirmation politics has become increasingly important for
both parties. Needless to say, after Democrats took over the White House
and Congress in 2009, the Judiciary Committees shifted their focus away
from the social conservative agenda and toward the agenda of the Democratic Party.201 This shift may change which lawmakers serve on the Judiciary Committees, but it should not significantly impact the Committees’
continued interest in holding constitutional hearings.202
CONCLUSION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS IN
CONGRESS
Congressional committee interest in the Constitution has been on the
decline for more than two decades. Throughout this period and especially
since the 1995 Republican takeover of Congress, the vast majority of constitutional hearings have taken place in the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. To explain these two phenomena, this Article has pointed out
a range of factors that impact congressional interest in constitutional hearings. For reasons detailed in Part II, I argued that party polarization has
played a significant role in the decline in constitutional hearings in every
congressional committee except the Judiciary Committees. One factor in
199

These groups included the National Women’s Law Center, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Abortion Rights Action League. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R.
Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States
Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 504 (1998). For additional discussion of the Bork confirmation, see
generally BRONNER, supra note 23, and MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992).
The 2006 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization is another example of left-leaning interest groups pushing
for Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. See Persily, supra note 125, at 195 n.79.
200
See Devins, supra note 113, at 1355–58; Rosenfeld, supra note 134.
201
For discussions of this kind of shift, see Stern, supra note 160, and Keith Perine, The Senate
Committees: Judiciary, 64 CQ WKLY. 3034, 3034 (2006). Since Republicans gained control of the
House in 2011, there is good reason to think that abortion, immigration, and other issues salient to social
conservatives will again dominate House Judiciary constitutional hearings. See Robert Pear, Push for
Stricter Abortion Limits Is Expected in House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A34; Jennifer Steinhauer,
Republicans Name Leaders of House Committees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A38.
202
See supra notes 190–91191 and accompanying text (noting reluctance of House Democrats to
serve on the Judiciary Committee during Republican presidencies).
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particular, party polarization, has contributed to numerous shifts in congressional practices, shifts that have discouraged committees from holding constitutional hearings. These shifts include the rise of message politics and
thus the increasing emphasis on position taking; the declining influence of
congressional committees, including cutbacks in committee staff and increasing lawmaker emphasis on constituent services and reelection instead
of committee service; and the increasing refusal of committee leaders to allow the minority party to use hearings as a vehicle to raise constitutional
objections to committee proposals. Thus, to explain the shift toward Judiciary Committee control of constitutional hearings, Part III discussed the
competing incentives of the Judiciary Committees and other congressional
committees and explained why party polarization and declining lawmaker
interest in constitutional questions have not meaningfully impacted the
number of constitutional hearings held by the Judiciary Committees. There,
polarization has impacted hearing topics and witness lists instead.
Notwithstanding the importance of party polarization, constitutional
hearings can also be triggered by judicial decisions, changes in party leadership, executive branch initiatives, and the national policy agenda.203 These
variables are constantly in flux, and consequently, the number of constitutional hearings varies significantly from year to year. For example, although today’s lawmakers seem increasingly content to stake out policy
positions and let the courts sort out the constitutionality of their policy preferences,204 there may be a spike in constitutional hearings if the Roberts
Court undermines the first-order policy preferences of lawmakers.205
203

Some of these triggers are linked to party polarization. For example, the national policy agenda
may well be tied to the incentives of party leaders to take roll call votes on the very issues that divide the
parties. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
204
See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How
Lawmakers Spurred On the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 441–47 (2001) (identifying ways in which Congress signaled to the Rehnquist Court that it would acquiesce to Court invalidations of federal statutes).
205
Before the 2010 elections, there was reason to suspect that the ideological distance between the
Roberts Court and the Democratic Congress might have frustrated lawmaker preferences in ways that
would trigger constitutional hearings. The Roberts Court, after all, is especially conservative; the Democratic Congress was far more liberal than the Republican Congresses that witnessed the Rehnquist
Court’s revival of federalism and, with it, the invalidation of progressive legislation. See Adam Liptak,
Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1; see supra
note 144 and accompanying text (noting that Rehnquist Court’s invalidation of federal statutes may have
matched preferences of sitting Congress). Indeed, President Obama invited a Court–Congress confrontation by calling for legislation overturning the Citizens United ruling. See Michael D. Shear, Obama
Calls Citizens United Ruling ‘A Huge Blow,’ WASH. POST (May 1, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/05/obama-calls-citizens-united-ru.html.
Notwithstanding
Citizens United, the Roberts Court has largely operated within bounds acceptable to Congress and the
American people. See Dahlia Lithwick, Spoonfuls of Sugar, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2009, 7:36 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2229517/ (bemoaning public support of Roberts Court). At the end of the
2009–2010 Supreme Court Term, the conflict over the Court’s invalidation of campaign finance legislation in Citizens United stands alone as a point of friction between the Court and Congress. See supra
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The question remains: Is the past prologue? That is, will the trends
identified in this Article persist? I think the answer is a qualified yes. The
2007 Democratic takeover of Congress did not meaningfully impact Judiciary Committee control of constitutional hearings: in particular, unlike the
1995 Republican takeover, the 2007 Democratic takeover did not result in
an upswing in the number or percentage of constitutional hearings.206 Similarly, the election of President Obama did not meaningfully impact the
number of constitutional hearings: hearing numbers stayed constant in the
House and only decreased slightly in the Senate.207
What, then, will come of the 2011 Republican takeover of the
House?208 On the one hand, Republican leaders sought to make common
ground with the Tea Party movement during the 2010 campaign by questioning the constitutionality of health care legislation, embracing limited
government, and demanding that all legislation include language citing its
constitutional authority.209 On the other hand, there is little reason to think
that this embrace of first principles will result in more constitutional hearings. Most telling, although Republicans list their constitutional obligation
note 150 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the Roberts Court has sidestepped direct confrontations
with Congress. In 2008, for example, the Court employed the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
steer clear of a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act reauthorization. See Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). In so doing, the Court signaled its desire to avoid
triggering a political maelstrom by invalidating the reauthorization. See Barry Friedman, Benched: Why
the Supreme Court Is Irrelevant, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 2009, at 8–9; Jack Balkin, Why Has the Roberts Court Suddenly Gone Minimalist?, BALKINIZATION (June 29, 2009, 3:50 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-has-roberts-court-gone-minimalist.html. For a competing perspective, see Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts Versus Roberts, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2010, at 17–18, which
suggests that Chief Justice Roberts is prepared to strike down the Voting Rights Act, and also see Neal
Devins, Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 491 (2009), which details how the Roberts Court’s invalidation of the Military Commission
Act tracked lawmaker preferences.
206
See supra Figures 3, 5, 6 & 7. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that political polarization has impacted the relationship between interest groups and congressional committees. The
Constitution arguably plays a stronger role in the social conservative agenda than it does in the civil
rights agenda—so that Republicans will hold hearings on jurisdiction-stripping proposals whereas Democrats will seek to amend federal statutes governing employment discrimination, housing discrimination,
and the like. Along these lines, it is quite relevant that, since the 2007 Democratic takeover of Congress,
the Roberts Court has yet to meaningfully frustrate the first-order policy preferences of Democratic interest group constituents. See supra note 205.
207
See supra Figure 1.
208
Republicans also gained seats in the Senate, strengthening their power to filibuster and otherwise
block legislation. But Democrats are still the majority and therefore retain the agenda-setting power in
the Senate including the power to decide whether to hold hearings and whether and which constitutional
witnesses should testify at hearings.
209
See supra note 129 (discussing statements of House Minority Leader John Boehner and House
Minority Whip Eric Cantor). For its part, the Tea Party promulgated a Contract from America, embracing an agenda grounded in “individual liberty, limited government, and economic freedom” and calling
for Congress to “restore fiscal responsibility & constitutionally limited government.” The Contract from
America, CONTRACT FROM AM., http://www.thecontract.org/the-contract-from-america (last visited June
3, 2011).
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to oversee the Executive Branch as among their first priorities,210 Republicans have no specific constitutional agenda to pursue and have made no
mention of citing the constitutional foundations of laws as a Republican
oversight priority.211 And even though House Republicans recently embraced a rule calling for legislation to specify its constitutional source,212
Republican leadership will not advance legislation it disapproves of and
whose constitutionality it might well question.213 And if it approves of a
bill, there is no reason to think that it will hold hearings to examine the
bill’s constitutional foundations. Instead, it might well “find in the Constitution whatever authority it needs to do as it pleases.”214
Yet even if there is eventually a meaningful upswing in constitutional
hearings, the central points made in this Article remain accurate. More than
anything, this Article has tried to unpack the factors that contribute to the
decision to hold constitutional hearings, arguing that party polarization
tends to reduce the number of constitutional hearings outside the Judiciary
Committees but also that the number of constitutional hearings will ebb and
flow depending on presidential initiatives, the national policy agenda, and
court decisions. Any upswing in constitutional hearings will almost certainly be caused by the same factors that contribute to the ongoing ebb and flow
of constitutional hearings. Party polarization does and will continue to depress the average number of constitutional hearings. Absent meaningful
supermajority control by one party or the other,215 polarization will continue

210

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., A
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (2010),
available at http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Reports/9-22-10_OGR_Report_-_A_
Constitutional_Obligation_-_Congressional_Oversight_of_the_Executive_Branch.pdf.
211
See id.; see also Ben Weyl, The House Committees: Oversight and Government Reform, 68 CQ
WKLY. 2542, 2542–43 (2010). It is also noteworthy that Republican leadership limited the role of the
Tea Party in its transition team. See James Downie, Are Boehner and Cantor Freezing Out the Tea Party?, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 8, 2010, 2:34 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/78997/moderategop-transition.
212
H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, Jan. 5, 2011).
213
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that lawmakers typically question a bill’s constitutionality when they disapprove of the bill).
214
Perry Bacon Jr., A Closer Look at GOP ‘Pledge to America,’ WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2010, at
A17.
215
From July 2009, following the seating of Minnesota Democrat Al Franken, to January 2010,
when Republican Scott Brown won a special election in Massachusetts, Democrats had a sixty-vote supermajority control of the Senate. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 123; Alex Wayne & Drew Armstrong,
Election Upsets Overhaul Plans, 68 CQ WKLY. 236 (2010). Even so, Republicans were able to derail or
moderate much of the Democratic agenda during this time. See supra notes 122–23, 129 and accompanying text; see also Herszenhorn, supra note 14; Alan K. Ota, Bad Climate for Crossovers, 68 CQ
WKLY. 1542, 1542–43 (2010); Rubin, supra note 14, at 122–23; Shatz, supra note 84, at 434–35. Needless to say, the election of Senator Brown made it more difficult for Democrats to pursue their legislative
agenda.
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to result in party-line voting and to make it very difficult for Congress to
enact major legislation.216
In closing, I would like to discuss two questions raised but not answered by this Article. First, this Article does not attempt to answer whether
congressional consideration of constitutional questions is a public good that
we should value and develop ways to incentivize. Even if the Constitution
becomes more vibrant and more enduring when all branches of government
consider constitutional questions,217 mechanisms that facilitate lawmaker interest in the Constitution may either prove counterproductive or otherwise
require fundamental changes in our system of government.218 Second, this
Article is not intended to encourage courts to be opportunistic in advancing
their preferred vision of law or policy. Although there may be little risk of
legislative backlash because of declining lawmaker interest in constitutional
questions and increasing belief that courts need not defer to congressional
judgments,219 Congress remains “our most democratic branch,” and it may
be that judicial deference should be moored to that anchor rather than institutional engagement or competence.220 For this very reason, I hope that this
216

The fact that it is harder to enact major legislation, of course, does not mean that Congress is incapable of enacting such legislation. In 2010, Congress enacted both healthcare legislation and legislation regulating Wall Street. At the same time, for reasons noted supra notes 84, 122, and 215, today’s
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress has had a difficult time pursuing its legislative agenda. Apparently, sixty Democratic Senators is not quite enough for effective supermajority control in today’s polarized Congress.
217
See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 118, at 217–39; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 104–05 (1998).
218
Proposals to improve congressional performance include the creation of a specialized “Committee on the Constitution” to provide a “constitutional impact statement” on proposed legislation and the
evisceration of judicial review altogether to create needed incentives for Congress to pursue constitutional questions. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 86, at 1319–39; see also TUSHNET, supra note 95,
at 163–72. For critiques of these proposals, see Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the
Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 359, 367–71 (2000), which notes that
the elimination of judicial review will result in the centralization of constitutional authority in the President, not Congress, and Tushnet, supra note 96, at 504–08, which describes difficulties of implementing
the “Committee on the Constitution” proposal. Another proposal, suggested to me by Hans Linde, is to
change the rules governing lawmaker standing. That would allow minority lawmakers to pressure the
majority party to take constitutional issues seriously because minority party members would have an opportunity to raise those issues in court. The rub here, of course, is the need to overhaul Supreme Court
doctrine on lawmaker standing and some fundamental tenets of our system of checks and balances. See
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1996) (holding that members of Congress lack standing to allege a cause
of action when official congressional power as a whole is affected).
219
According to the strategic model of judicial behavior, judges should take backlash risks into account when crafting their decisions. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
9–18 (1998); see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997) (discussing why courts must consider Congress’s preferences and changes in the political environment).
220
Sinclair, supra note 76, at 397. By raising this issue, I am not suggesting that Congress’s disinterest in constitutional questions is principally a byproduct of “judicial overhang,” the tendency of
lawmakers to steer clear of the constitutional thicket by delegating that power to the judiciary. See
TUSHNET, supra note 95, at 57–60 (suggesting that congressional disinterest is largely a result of “judi-
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Article is not seen as a condemnation of Congress: my aim has been merely
to note congressional practices over time and to identify the various factors
that determine the number and location of constitutional hearings.

cial overhang”). Instead, I mean to suggest, though not embrace, an alternative justification for judicial
deference to Congress: the historic practice of the Supreme Court to defer to legislative judgments and
“the democratic process.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
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